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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the impact of the separate elements of corporate governance on enterprise 
financial performance explained in three separate models (ROA, ROE, and Debt Ratio) for non-
financial companies present within the S&P Pan Arab Composite Index. The data on corporate 
governance choices includes 225 firms for ten years from 2006 to 2015 gathered from ORBIS, 
Reuters Eikon, Datastream, as well as, annual and board reports. The firms included in this study 
are all listed respective to their country‘s stock exchange, which are present in eleven Arab 
countries namely: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Tunisia and United Arab Emirates. The corporate governance variables are divided into 
board structure variables (which includes Board size, Board independence, Duality Separation, 
and Diversity), ownership structure variables (which includes Ownership concentration, Direct 
ownership, Institutional ownership, and Foreign ownership), and controlled variables (which 
includes Firm size, Firm age, Industry type, Auditor type, as well as country Foreign exchange, 
Inward FDI, Outward FDI, GDP and Revolution). Furthermore, the topic attempts to understand 
the significance of the Arab Spring uprising on firm performance using the ROA and ROE 
measurements and debt ratio as a measurement of firm leverage. Furthermore, the data is used to 
compare the corporate governance variables five years before the Arab Spring uprising to the 
five years during/after the uprising. 
Regression results are demonstrated in the form of models. Model 1 shows the effect of 
corporate governance on firm performance measured by ROA.  Results show that there is a 
significant positive relationship with board size, institutional ownership, audit type on firm 
performance measured by ROA, also there a significant negative relationship with duality, 
foreign ownership, firm size and the revolution variable on firm performance measured by ROA. 
Model 2 shows the effect of corporate governance on firm performance measured by ROE.  
Results show that there is a significant positive relationship with board size, institutional 
ownership, audit type on firm performance measured by ROE, also there a significant negative 
relationship with duality, firm size and the revolution variable on firm performance measured by 
ROE. Model 3 shows the effect of corporate governance on firm performance measured by Debt 
Ratio.  Results show that there is a significant positive relationship with director ownership, 
foreign ownership, firm size, foreign exchange rate and the revolution variable on firm 
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performance measured by Debt Ratio, also there a significant negative relationship with duality, 
institutional ownership and firm age on firm performance measured by ROE. 
After conducing Mann-Whitney U test, results shows that the variables ROA, ROE, ownership 
concentration, director ownership, institutional ownership,  foreign ownership, firm size, firm 
age, foreign exchange rate, outward foreign direct investment, inward foreign direct investment 
and GDP are all statistically significant. The variables ROA, ROE, foreign exchange rate, 
outward foreign direct investment and inward foreign direct investment were a higher mean rank 
before the Arab Spring uprising compared to during/after the Arab Spring uprising. On the other 
hand, the variables ownership concentration, director ownership, institutional ownership,  foreign 
ownership, firm size, firm age and GDP were a higher mean rank during/after the Arab Spring 
uprising compared to before the Arab Spring uprising. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
Acknowledgment 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Mohamed Basuony for 
his constant support with my thesis, his never-ending patience that would calm me down during 
my panicking moments, his continuous life changing advice, and his encyclopedic knowledge on 
many topics that would enlighten. His guidance has not only directed and helped me finish my 
thesis, but also helped shape my mind on a different level, and opened me the door of research 
and academia. No other supervisor would have been a better fit for my master‘s thesis or even 
dealing with me as a person. 
Many thanks to Prof. Dr. Ehab K. A. Mohamed for providing me with various advice and 
comments, as well as, welcoming me into his home as if I were part of the family. 
Also, I would like to express my sincere thanks to Mr. Omar Marie, Mr. Amr El-Sayed, Ms. 
Noran El-Kashef, Ms. Dalia Deshnawy and Ms. Reham Shawkat for their constant advice and 
assistance that are too many to mention. 
Last but not least, my sincere gratitude to all family and friends for their prayers on graduating 
from the master‘s program all in one piece. 
 
With all of them, this thesis wouldn‘t have been possible. I thank them all. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................................... 2 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 9 
2. Literature Review ................................................................................................................................ 14 
2.1. History and Definition ...................................................................................................................... 14 
2.2. Corporate Governance Theories ...................................................................................................... 16 
2.3. Corporate Governance Codes and Guidelines ................................................................................. 21 
2.4. Corporate Governance in the Middle East ...................................................................................... 26 
3. Hypotheses Development ................................................................................................................... 29 
3.1 Board Structure ................................................................................................................................. 29 
Board Size ........................................................................................................................................... 29 
Board Independence ........................................................................................................................... 30 
Duality Separation .............................................................................................................................. 30 
Diversity .............................................................................................................................................. 32 
3.2 Ownership Structure ................................................................................................................... 33 
Ownership Concentration ................................................................................................................... 33 
Director Ownership ............................................................................................................................ 34 
Institutional Ownership....................................................................................................................... 35 
Foreign Ownership ............................................................................................................................. 36 
3.3 Control Variables ......................................................................................................................... 37 
Firm Size ............................................................................................................................................. 37 
Firm Age ............................................................................................................................................. 38 
Industry Type ...................................................................................................................................... 39 
Audit Type ........................................................................................................................................... 39 
Macroeconomic Country Variables .................................................................................................... 39 
Revolution ........................................................................................................................................... 40 
 6 
 
4. Methodology ....................................................................................................................................... 42 
4.1.1 Population and Sample Selection .................................................................................................. 42 
Table (1) - Sample Distribution by Sectors......................................................................................... 42 
Table (2) - Sample Distribution by Country ....................................................................................... 43 
4.1.2 Index Methodology .................................................................................................................... 43 
4.1.3 Eligibility Factors Float-Adjustment.......................................................................................... 43 
4.2 Data Collection .................................................................................................................................. 44 
4.3 Measurement of Variables ................................................................................................................ 44 
Table (3) - Definition and Measurement of Variables ........................................................................ 47 
4.4 Research Method .............................................................................................................................. 48 
Table (4): Hypothesis Development ................................................................................................... 48 
5. Findings and analysis .......................................................................................................................... 51 
5.1 Descriptive Analysis and Hypotheses Testing ................................................................................... 51 
5.2.1 Model 1 .......................................................................................................................................... 53 
Table (6-1) – Coefficients for dependent variable ROA ..................................................................... 53 
Table (6-2) – Model Summary for dependent variable ROA ............................................................. 53 
Table (6-3) – ANOVA for dependent variable ROA .......................................................................... 54 
5.2.2 Model 2 .......................................................................................................................................... 58 
Table (7-1) – Coefficients for dependent variable ROE ..................................................................... 58 
Table (7-2) – Model Summary for dependent variable ROE .............................................................. 58 
Table (7-3) – ANOVA for dependent variable ROE .......................................................................... 59 
5.2.3 Model 3 .......................................................................................................................................... 63 
Table (8-1) – Coefficients for dependent variable DR ........................................................................ 63 
Table (8-2) – Model Summary for dependent variable DR ................................................................ 63 
Table (8-3) – ANOVA for dependent variable DR ............................................................................. 64 
 7 
 
5.3 Mann-Whitney Test .......................................................................................................................... 68 
6. Summary and Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 71 
6.1 Research limitations .......................................................................................................................... 73 
6.2 Quality of information ...................................................................................................................... 74 
6.3 Future Research ................................................................................................................................ 75 
Appendix (1) ............................................................................................................................................... 77 
REFRENCES .............................................................................................................................................. 80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Corporate Governance commonly refers to the established codes and guidelines that determine 
how a company should function and operate. The company‘s board of directors implements the 
corporate governance process by approving and constant reviewing of such guidelines, as well 
as, make sure that it is aligned with the company‘s regulatory practices, direction, and 
performance.  
Corporate governance guidelines specify the rights, as well as, power distribution of a 
company‘s stakeholders with emphasis on three different types of groups, board of directors, 
shareholders, and company management. Such practices and guidelines that are implemented are 
to ensure the company operates ethically and optimally as possible. (Brink, 2011) 
Claessens (2006) states a definition of corporate governance falls into two different categories. 
The first category is concerned with a set of corporate behavior, which is measured by 
performance, efficiency, and growth. The second category is following an ideal or standard 
regulatory practice, which is derived from the legal system and financial market regulations. A 
major and commonly referred to definition of corporate governance within literature and 
commonly recognized codes for corporate governance is that it‘s a system by which firms are 
directed and controlled (Demirag, 1998; Karagiorgos et al., 2010; The Cadbury Report, 1992; 
OECD, 2004). 
There is an uncertainty factor from shareholders regarding board of directors‘ decisions, and 
whether the management and judgment of the directors is aligned with the interest of the 
shareholders. Such uncertainty exists because shareholders are not always aware of the thought 
process and decision making of the board of directors, which creates a between both parties. To 
solve this gap, the corporate governance mechanism, as stated by Becht, Bolton, Roell (2003), 
secures the rights of shareholders by it determined governmental rules and regulations. Hence, 
corporate governance represents the bridge that fills the relationship gap between shareholders 
and the board of directors (Emile et al., 2014). 
The importance corporate Governance has been cited to have an impact on a firm‘s performance 
and valuation, as stated by Becht, Bolton, Roell (2003), which is considered to greatly affect 
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shareholders interest within the firm. Since one of the tasks for the board of directors is to secure 
the rights of the stockholders within the corporation, it is highly significant to investigate the 
characteristics of the board and its effects on corporate performance. 
Research and literature review suggests that poor quality of corporate governance leads to poor 
performance among corporate entities (O'Regan et al., 2004). Interestingly, there is relatively 
little paid attention to the developments in the Pan-Arab region, especially after the uprising of 
the Arab Spring that has swept different parts of the region. Also, there is relatively little or 
limited empirical evidence known about Pan-Arab firms involvement in business and finance 
along with the issues related to board effectiveness, considering the region contains rich, 
uprising, and emerging markets. Also, the effectiveness of corporate governance variables 
present within Pan-Arab firm is questionable with little literature review for reference that only 
covers firms from single countries or limited number of grouped countries instead of covering 
the entire Arab region. 
The implementation of corporate governance frameworks in the Middle East has been growing 
and undergone a substantial evolution over the past decade.  The improvement of policy and law 
regulations, execution of corporate governance rules and guidelines and the development of 
market regulators in the Middle Eastern region has been tremendous over the years. (Amico, 
2014) 
Even though the application of corporate governance present within Pan-Arab countries is under 
development, corporate bodies must support new initiatives and legislations, as well as, constant 
improvement and revision of the corporate governance code throughout the region in order to 
enhance firm competitiveness and effectiveness. The real challenge is the development and 
application of effective governance practices and mechanisms which will ensure greater 
transparency and will further facilitate innovation among business operations within the region 
(Baydoun et al, 2012). 
Despite constant reforms and demands being made, socio-economic and political challenges has 
arisen as a result of the Arab Spring aftermath that has swept the entire region. The Arab Spring 
uprisings have blamed weak governance implementation, absence of accountability and policies 
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serving certain groups and not serving the general public. The widespread of corruption and 
embedded mal-governance has influenced the citizens of the affected countries to undergo 
transformation by redefine their social contracts with their governments and rebuild their trust in 
their institutions. However, if these challenges are properly addressed, it should lead to even 
further corporate governance reform.  
In this paper, different corporate governance variables along with financial data of Pan-Arab 
firms will be reviewed to measure and analyze the effectiveness of corporate governance and  its 
significance to the firm‘s performance, and also,  comparing the corporate governance variables 
five years before the Arab Spring uprising to the five years during/after the uprising. The study 
tests this through regression analysis (OLS) adopted by using the statistical package (SPSS) in 
order to understand the relationship between the independent variables (board of directors and 
ownership structure), controlled variables including macroeconomic variables, and dependent 
variables. This includes 225 listed non-financial firms from eleven Pan-Arab countries that were 
gathered from the S&P Dow Jones Pan Arab Composite Index. 
The corporate governance mechanisms chosen and discussed in this paper are as follows. The 
independent corporate governance variables are; board size, board independence, CEO duality, 
female directors on board, ownership concentration, director ownership, institutional ownership, 
and foreign ownership. The controlled corporate governance variables are; firm size, firm age, 
industry type, auditor type, foreign exchange rate (FX), inward and outward foreign direct 
investment, gross domestic product (GDP) and a revolution variable accounting for during/after 
and before the Arab Spring uprising of the year 2011. The dependent variables or firm 
performance is measured by return on assets and return on equity; these ratios are used 
extensively in the literature as measures of profits. Also, the debt ratio, which is measured by 
long term and short term debt to total assets, is used to capture the leverage of the firm. 
This paper is organized as follows. Chapter 1 includes a brief introduction for the study, research 
question and variables. Chapter 2 explores the origins and different interpreted meanings of 
corporate governance, the fundamental theories associated with corporate governance, the 
commonly recognized corporate governance codes and guidelines, and a brief summary on 
corporate governance in the Middle East specifically in Pan-Arab countries. Chapter 3 reviews 
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the existing empirical research on the effect of corporate governance variables on firm 
performance, different methodological approaches, and their findings that will lead to the study‘s 
hypothesis development. Chapter 4 discusses the methodological approach for the study, the 
population and sample selection, the different sources used for the data collection, the definitions 
and measurements for the variables used for this study and the research method that will be used. 
Chapter 5 reports the findings and analysis of the hypothesis testing for each of the three models 
used, as well as reporting the results from Mann-Whitney U Test. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes 
and concludes the study, as well as, mentions research limitations, quality of information and 
proposed recommendation for future research. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. History and Definition 
 
The discussion of the history of corporate governance should be initiated by discussing the 
background of corporations, which is traced back to the middle ages until the industrial 
revolution. Firms in its current form are a product of a semi-governmental form of a kingdom 
created for a specific trading purpose. Modern firms in their current state later evolved from a 
single individual sponsorship into a financing arrangement controlled by a group of people with 
similar interest that devoted huge capital investments in order to feed the firm‘s investment needs 
to achieve firm sustainability and expansion. (Adelopo, 2013) 
As ownership developments were unfolding, it was important to understand and observe the 
firms structure and operation. A study by Berle and Mean‘s (1932) attracted devotion to issues of 
governance by suggesting as corporations expand and become bigger, there is a clear separation 
between firm owners and their management and there should a form of a bond between both 
parties. (Adelopo, 2013) 
Studies by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980) suggested the possibility of conflicts of 
interest between firm management, the insiders who are in control, and investors, the outside 
owners which have no direct role over management, which launched discussions on corporate 
governance (Adelopo, 2013). 
Recently, discussion on corporate governance has been widely used professionally and 
academically and has gained popularity due to the corporate collapses as a result of conflicts of 
interest, poor ethics and corporate dishonesty and fragile internal controls and risk assessment, 
despite corporate governance has no generally accepted or precise definition that could be agreed 
upon. The disagreement could be as a result of its capability of many uses and applications 
where the term cuts through many disciplines such as management, law, behavioral science and 
humanities which are used in both private and business world and relevant to business of 
governments. (Razzaee, 2009; Adelopo, 2013) 
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The term‘s definition is changed when approached by people with a different discipline and 
view. The complexity in capturing an agreeable definition of corporate governance along with its 
diversity of its applications can be best explained in the following quotation by Maw et al. 
(1994): 
―Some commentators take too narrow a view, and say it (Corporate Governance) is the fancy 
term for the way in which directors and auditors handle their responsibilities towards 
shareholders. Others use the expression as if it were synonymous with shareholder democracy. 
Corporate governance is a topic recently conceived, as yet ill-defined, and consequently blurred 
at the edges.  
Corporate governance as a subject, as an objective, or as a regime to be followed for the good of 
shareholders, employees, customers, bankers, and indeed for the reputation and standing of our 
nation and its economy.‖ (Maw et al., 1994: Page 1)  
 
Others have attempted to point out a more robust definition for the term. According to Cadbury 
(1992), ―Corporate governance is the system by which institutions are directed and controlled. 
Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their institutions. The shareholders' 
role in governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an 
appropriate governance structure is in place‖. 
 
The OECD (2004) advisory group explains the definition of corporate governance that it ―is the 
system by which business corporations are directed and controlled. The corporate governance 
structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in 
the corporation, such as, the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells 
out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also 
provides the structure through which the company objectives are set, and the means of attaining 
those objectives and monitoring performance.‖ 
 
The Basel Committee (2010) defines corporate governance, specifically for banks and financial 
institutions, as ―the manner in which the business and affairs of individual financial institutions 
are governed by their boards of directors and senior management.‖ 
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Furthermore, Karagiorgos et al. (2010) defined corporate governance as ―the total of operations 
and controls of the institution or as an overall structured system of principles according to which 
an institution operates and is organized, managed and controlled.‖ 
 
On the other hand, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) described corporate governance might deal with 
the ways in which suppliers of finance to institutions ensure themselves of getting a return on 
their investment. Also, Sternberg (1998) defined corporate governance that it designates means 
of certifying that agents and actions of an institution are directed to accomplish the goals 
established by the institution‘s shareholders. 
 
A major and commonly referred to definition of corporate governance within literature and 
commonly recognized codes for corporate governance is that it‘s a system by which firms are 
directed and controlled (Demirag, 1998; Karagiorgos et al., 2010; The Cadbury Report, 1992; 
OECD, 2004). 
 
2.2. Corporate Governance Theories 
 
There has been an evolution of theories concerning corporate governance mechanisms that 
companies enforce into their own corporate structure. The fundamental theories discussed within 
corporate governance were initiated with the agency theory, which later evolved into the 
stewardship theory and stakeholder theory and later the resource dependency theory.  
The theories that will be discussed reports the cause and its effect on corporate governance 
variables, such as the structure of board members and its committees along with their roles 
within the corporation, in addition to, their social relationships rather than their regulatory 
frameworks. Therefore, it is suggested that a combination of several theories is best to describe 
an effective governance practice rather than hypothesizing corporate governance based on a 
singular or unified theory. (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009) 
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Agency theory 
The agency relationship exists when a party, being the principle, hires agents for the company to 
act on the principal‘s behalf. However, if both the principle and agent focuses on maximizing 
their own utility, there is a chance that the agent might not always act in the principal‘s best 
interest (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
The main principal of the agency theory is to resolve conflicts that arise from the separation of 
ownership and management over the control of the corporation (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 
1986; Bhimani, 2008). 
The agency theory specifies certain mechanisms which resolve two problems within the agency 
relationship which reduces agency loss. 
 The first issue is the interests of both the principle and the agent are not aligned, which 
later, results a conflict. Also, when the principal cannot verify or measure if the agent is 
fulfilling the job requirements or even be certain if the agent is exerting maximum effort. 
 The second issue is when the principal and agent have different preferences towards risk 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Hence, the agency theory is the study of the agency relationship and 
the issues that arise from the principal and agent dilemma which results in an agency loss. 
However, Bruce et al. (2005) objects to agency theory stating that it wholly ―relies on an 
assumption of self-interested agents who seek to maximize personal economic wealth‖. 
Agency loss is viewed as the difference between the maximum beneficial outcome possible for 
the principal and the consequences of the agent‘s acts.  If the interests of an agent are consistent 
and aligned with the interests of the principal‘s, as a result, zero agency loss occurs. However, 
when the agent‘s interests diverge from the principal‘s interests, a higher agency loss occurs. 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991) 
In order to solidify the alignment of interest and decrease the level of managerial opportunism, 
an outcome based contract between the principle and agent influences the behavior of the agent 
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to be within then interest of the principle. Such a contract can include appropriate incentive 
schemes for managers as a financial reward for maximizing shareholder wealth such as profit 
sharing or offering the company‘s shares at a reduced price. (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Moreover, another method the agency theory proposes in order to solve the agency problem is 
the agent aligns with principle interest when the principle holds information that verifies the 
agent‘s behavior. Information systems are more likely to curb the agent‘s opportunism and 
becomes in tune with the principle that now is aware of the agent‘s movement. The role of 
efficient capital and labor markets can be used as an information system to control executive 
opportunism (Fama, 1980). The role of the board of directors also can be used as an information 
mechanism to monitor executive behavior (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Information mechanism is 
described such as budgeting systems, reporting procedures or even hiring additional independent 
and non-executive employees all for monitoring purposes. 
Donaldson and Davis (1991) agree that an effective mechanism to restrain such divergence of 
management from shareholder interest is the board of directors by explaining the board provides 
a monitoring of managerial actions on behalf of shareholders especially when the board chair is 
independent from executive management. It is further explained that when an executive holds a 
dual role of CEO and board chair, owner‘s interest is sacrificed as a result of managerial 
opportunism and furthers agency loss.  
The stewardship theory 
On the contrary of the agency theory, the stewardship theory has been introduced as a method of 
defining relationships based on other behavioral premises in a sense that it stresses on the role of 
top management as being stewards rather than individualists, which integrates their goals as part 
of the organization (Donaldson 1990a; Donaldson 1990b; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Hence, 
the stewardship theory holds that there is neither integral nor general issue of executive and 
upper management motivation. 
However, questions arise of how far executives can achieve the virtuous corporate performance 
to which they desire (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). The key depends solely on the organization 
structure which provides clear role expectations and assists executives to formulate plans and 
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successfully implement them to achieve superior corporate performance (Donaldson, 1985; 
Donaldson and Davis, 1991) 
Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997) defined the role of a ‗steward‘ where ―a steward 
protects and maximizes shareholders wealth through firm performance, because by so doing, the 
steward‘s utility functions are maximized‖. The main assumption underlying the stewardship 
theory is the behaviors of the agents are aligned with the interests of the principals, where the 
economic benefits for the principal within the stewardship theory results lower transaction costs, 
which is associated with the lower need for economic incentives and monitoring. (Pastoriza and 
Ariño, 2008). 
The stewardship theory places greater significance on goals in conjunction with the parties 
involved in corporate governance than on the agent‘s own interest (Van Slyke, 2006). Stewards 
are motivated by intrinsic rewards, such as mutuality and goal alignment, rather than solely on 
extrinsic rewards. The steward, as opposed to the agent, places greater value on collective and 
mutual goals rather than individual goals; the steward recognizes the success of the company as 
if it is his or her own achievement. Thus, the major difference between both the agency theory 
and the stewardship theory is on the nature of motivation; the agency theory places more 
emphasis on extrinsic motivation, while on the other hand, the stewardship theory is focused on 
intrinsic rewards that are not easily quantifiable. (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997) 
The stakeholder theory 
The corporation has earned a role greater than business tractions, however, has become a method 
of organizing economic life (Freeman, 2001). Within that same sense, managers have a duty not 
only towards stockholders, but also must keep a fiduciary relationship among stakeholders. 
As stated by Freeman (1984), stakeholders can be defined ―any group or individual who is 
affected by or can affect the achievement of an organization‘s objectives‖ whereas the 
stakeholder theory was created for the purpose to plan methods to manage the relationships of 
these groups and individuals in a strategic manner. 
The successful strategies are those that assimilate and take consideration the interests of all 
stakeholders rather than maximizing the position of a single group (Freeman, 2001). Arguably, 
 20 
 
Freeman‘s (1984) definition of stakeholders is considered to be a broad definition as it nearly 
includes anyone (Mitchell, et al., 1997). Additionally, Freeman (2010) revisited the definition of 
stakeholders to be ―groups or individuals that benefit or harmed, and whose rights are violated or 
respected by organization operations‖. 
During the year 1963, an internal memo generated by the Stanford Research Institute (now 
known as SRI international) has argued that in order to achieve long term success, managers 
needed to develop objectives that stakeholders will support which required exploring the 
concerns and relationships of groups such as employees, customers, suppliers, lenders and 
society in general. Such theories had minor impact at the time on management theories. 
However, during the 1980‘s, the stakeholder approach returned as a framework for strategic 
management when it was mentioned and happened to be highly related to concepts such as  
corporate planning, systems theory, corporate social responsibility and organizational theory. 
(Freeman, 2001) 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) argued that the stakeholder theory focuses on managerial decision 
making and interests of all stakeholders, in such all stakeholders have intrinsic value where no 
sets of interests of a particular group dominates the others. On the other hand, Clarkson (1995) 
defines stakeholders as ―constituencies‖ that are affected by a corporation‘s operation, regardless 
of whether the stakeholders are linked through explicit (direct) or implicit (indirect) contracts. 
Hence, it is concluded that stakeholder theory is less of a formal unified theory and more of a 
broad research tradition that incorporates different inter-related concepts from organizational 
science to social responsibility (Abdullah and Valentine, 2009). 
Resource dependency theory 
On the contrary of the stakeholder theory, which focuses on relationships with many groups for 
individual benefits, the resource dependency theory focuses on the role of board of directors in 
delivering access to resources that is needed by the corporation (Abdullah and Valentine, 2009). 
The resource dependency theory argues that the role of directors serves in connecting with the 
external environment in order to secure essential resources, navigate external contingencies, and 
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provide insights from diverse perspectives (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hillman, Canella and 
Paetzold, 2000).  
Moreover, some directors themselves are recognized as providers of resources that are needed 
for an organization, which further proves that the board of directors is considered to be an 
important mechanism that links an organization with the external environment (Hambrick et al., 
2015). 
The shareholder theory 
Originally proposed by Milton Friedman, the shareholder theory proclaims that shareholders 
advance capital to a company and its managers, where such capital is supposed to be spent on 
corporate funds only that are authorized and approved by the shareholders (Smith, 2003). The 
shareholder theory makes the only corporate responsibility for a firm is to focus on maximizing 
profits, which is considered to be the shareholders main interest. (Lee, 2008) 
Hence, the ultimate goal for managers is to use the capital for organizations with a main purpose 
to increase the returns of the firm, which in response increases the return of the shareholders. 
(Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, & Servaes, 2003) 
2.3. Corporate Governance Codes and Guidelines 
 
Commonly recognized codes and reports are heavily referenced that were published for the sole 
purpose of promoting and guiding to good corporate governance practices. The Cadbury Report 
(1992), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Principles of 
Corporate Governance (1999 and 2004), and the Sarbanes-Oxley Law (2002) are among the 
most commonly referred to guidelines when referencing the general principles of good 
governance. (Anca, 2012) 
The reason behind choosing such guidelines is to understand the important variables in order to 
within research method, variables and hypothesis. 
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The Cadbury report 
On May 1991, the London Stock Exchange set up a committee under the leadership of Sir Arian 
Cadbury. The committee was set up during the heightening of unexpected failures of major 
firms, for the main purpose to help raise the standards of corporate governance and restore the 
level of confidence in financial reporting. The committee drafted the Cadbury report, which sets 
out the methods of governance needed to achieve a balance between the essential powers of the 
Board of Directors and their proper accountability. (Cadbury report, 1992). 
Some of the important codes mentioned within the Cadbury report are: 
Board of directors, chairman, and CEO 
A clear accepted division of responsibilities among the chairman and chief executive of the 
company to ensure the balance of power and separation of authority within the firm. When the 
chair is also the chief executive, the board should increase the independent element to avoid 
power concentration. Adding a senior non-executive director or a deputy chairman to the board 
is recommended when there is a chairman and chief executive duality. (Cadbury report, 1992) 
Executive directors 
Each and every publicly traded company should be headed by an effective board which can lead 
and control the business .Board effectiveness includes all board members to work under a 
chairman in order to provide leadership and regulation which are both effective governance 
demands. (Cadbury report, 1992) 
The board should not only include a combination of executive directors, but also a number of 
outside non-executive directors, who can bring a broader and a more independent view to the 
company‘s operations. (Cadbury report, 1992) 
Each executive director should not exceed the duration of three years on the board. There should 
be full disclosure on the directors and chairman salary and performance pay. A remuneration 
committee should be set up and consist of non-executive directors that recommends the pay of 
executive directors. (Cadbury report, 1992) 
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All directors are equally responsible for the board‘s actions and decisions. Particular directors 
may have certain responsibilities for which they are responsible to the board. (Cadbury report, 
1992) 
Non-executive 
The board should include a sufficient number of non-executive directors for their views to carry 
significant contribution and weight in the board‘s decisions in order to maintain the standards of 
corporate governance. Non-executive directors have two important contributions to make to the 
governance process because of their independence from executive responsibility. (Cadbury 
report, 1992) 
 The first is in reviewing the performance of the board and of the executive where they 
address this aspect of their responsibilities carefully and should ensure that the chairman 
is aware of their views. (Cadbury report, 1992) 
 The second is in taking the lead where potential conflicts of interest arise. Non-executive 
director‘s interests are less directly affected by executive management interest, where 
they should also bring an independent judgment to bear on issues of strategy, 
performance, resources, including key appointments, and standards of conduct. (Cadbury 
report, 1992) 
It is recommended that the composition of sub-committees of the board requires a minimum of 
three non-executive directors, one of whom may be the chairman of the company provided he or 
she is not also its executive head. Moreover, the majority of the non-executive directors should 
be independent. Independent as in the directors should be independent from management and 
free from any business or other relationship which could materially interfere with the exercise of 
their independent judgment. (Cadbury report, 1992) 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
The Sarbanes-Oxley law (SOX) was created by U.S. government authorities for the sole purpose 
to regulate several principles of good governance which includes many of the principles 
mentioned and supported in the Cadbury and OECD reports. The SOX act led a major change in 
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accounting and financial reporting which caused an increase control on corporate governance, 
which protects investor‘s investment and prevents further loss of confidence in the U.S. stock 
market. 
Some of the major points mentioned within the SOX act are: 
Public company accounting oversight board 
The establishment of a ‗Public Company Accounting Oversight Board‘ consisting of five 
members where the term of service of each board member shall not exceed five years until a 
successor is chosen and appointed.  The establishment is needed in order to oversee the audit of 
publicly traded companies as a result to protect the interests of investors and public interest while 
preparing accurate and independent audit reports. (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002) 
Auditor independence  
The establishment of standards for the independence of external auditors such as restrictions for 
audit firms from bookings, consulting, and brokerage form the same client. Accounting policies 
and practices should be reported under the generally accepted accounting principles. Financial 
statements should be accurate and truthful and free of misleading information and must disclose 
all information available along with future changes if any backing it with an internal control 
report which assures the accuracy of financial reports and disclosures. (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
2002) 
Frequent audit partner rotation should occur every five fiscal years after the approval of the audit 
committee. The mandatory rotation of registered public accounting firms may be the auditor of 
record for a particular issuer no later than one year. (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002) 
Corporate responsibility 
The audit committee is directly responsible for the oversight of the work of any registered public 
accounting firm for the purpose of preparing or issuing an audit report or related work, and each 
such registered public accounting firm shall report directly to the audit committee. A member of 
an audit committee of an issuer may not be on the board of directors, or any other board 
committee. (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002) 
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The chief executive officer along with the chief financial officer, or any other person performing 
with similar functions, must certify each annual report filed has been reviewed and fairly 
presented to the best of their knowledge and that it is free of any misleading or untruthful 
statements. (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002) 
The OECD report 
The OECD Principles were developed in 1999 and last updated in 2004 and reviewed under the 
support of the OECD Corporate Governance Committee with all G20 countries invited to 
participate. The principles are intended to assist policy makers evaluate and improve the 
regulatory and institutional framework for corporate governance, with a view of supporting 
financial stability, economic efficiency and constant sustainable growth. 
Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework 
A framework of corporate governance should be developed with a broad-view to its impact on 
overall economic and market performance and integrity. The division of responsibilities among 
different parties should be clearly stated and designed to properly serve the public and company 
interest. (OECD, 2004) 
The rights and equitable treatment of shareholders and key ownership functions 
The framework of CG should protect shareholders rights and ensure equal treatment of all 
shareholders regardless of what class they fall under. Shareholder should participate in key 
corporate governance decisions, such as the nomination and election of board of directors. 
Conflicts of interest among the board members should be notified and addressed. (OECD, 2004) 
The role of stakeholders in corporate governance  
The framework of corporate governance should recognize the rights of stakeholders established 
by the federal law or through mutual agreements and encourage cooperation between 
corporations in creating prosperity, jobs, and financial stability. (OECD, 2004) 
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Disclosure and transparency 
The framework of corporate governance should ensure accurate and full disclosure is made on all 
firm matters, such as financial, performance, ownership, and governance, in a timely matter. An 
independent annual audit should be conducted by a competent and un-biased auditor in 
accordance of generally accepted auditing standards to provide external assurance to the board 
and shareholders that the firm‘s financial statements are fairly represented. (OECD, 2004) 
The responsibilities of the board 
The framework of corporate governance should ensure strategic and objective guidance of the 
firm, effective monitoring of management under the board‘s supervision, and the board‘s 
responsibility towards the firm and its shareholders. The board is primarily responsible for 
monitoring managerial performance, reviewing governance and corporate policies and 
procedures, addressing conflicts of interest, and balancing challenging corporate demands. In 
order to fulfill their responsibilities, the board must execute under an independent judgment that 
is within the company‘s and shareholders interest. (OECD, 2004) 
2.4. Corporate Governance in the Middle East 
 
The Middle East and North Africa region is considered to be one of the emerging markets in 
which corporate governance model has been seen as a new thought. Mostly family owned 
companies and small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) dominate the corporate scene and the 
private sector respectively within the region.  
Corporate governance is considered to play a key role in shaping a healthy business 
environment. Corporate governance values such as transparency, responsibility and fairness are 
considered significant starting points towards creating improved business practices. Good 
corporate governance influences better and transparent relationships among corporations‘ board 
of directors, shareholders, executives and other stakeholders. A stronger relationship among the 
parties is also influenced by the legal and regulatory framework as a result of implementing 
business ethics, governance codes and raising social and environmental awareness. 
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However, despite being a new concept within the region, corporate governance has been 
spreading through the Middle Eastern and North African countries and has been making 
significant in the past decade. Practitioners ranging from public and private sector, capital 
markets, banks and other financial institutions have accepted the need to address and 
implementation of corporate governance reform. Such needs are required in order to create a 
competitive market system and the development of law-based democracy society. 
Despite constant reforms and demands being made, socio-economic and political challenges has 
arisen as a result of the Arab Spring aftermath that has swept the entire region. The Arab Spring 
uprisings have blamed weak governance implementation, absence of accountability and policies 
serving certain groups and not serving the general public. The widespread of corruption and 
embedded mal-governance has influenced the citizens of the affected countries to undergo 
transformation by redefine their social contracts with their governments and rebuild their trust in 
their institutions. However, if these challenges are properly addressed, it should lead to even 
further corporate governance reform.  
The Middle Eastern and North African region has been determined and motivated to improve 
governance standards. Governance codes for listed companies have mostly been issued by 
MENA countries. However, issues arise regarding the implementation of such codes, especially 
in the areas of transparency and disclosure and board practices in particular. With no doubt, 
much of the weight of ensuring proper implementation falls on the different regulators present 
within the region. Institutional investors also can have a larger and active role in governance 
implementation and examine the governance arrangements of companies. (Nadal, 2013) 
Although most listed companies in the MENA countries implement governance codes, the focus 
and implementation of corporate governance on listed companies should also be applied towards 
family owned companies, small and medium sized enterprises and state owned enterprises in 
order to facilitate private sector growth. (Nadal, 2013) 
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3. Hypotheses Development 
 
3.1 Board Structure 
Board Size 
 
A study by Eisenberg et al.(1998) shows a negative correlation between small and medium sized 
firms profitability, when measured by ROA, and board size. It is further stated that the ideal 
board size differs depending on firm size. In closely held firms, communication and management 
coordination problems could arise, which would imply that owners choose less than the highest 
standard board structure. Hence, board size does reflect the composition of the board that 
matches their own capabilities, where its effects may have different roots in small closely held 
firms than in larger and more diverse firms. 
Larger boards can consist of more outsiders who may assist in more careful decision making 
policies in firms, since the reputation cost if the firm fails is likely to be high in comparison with 
their private benefit if a project turns out to be profitable. Board size affects investor decisions on 
the long run, where owners with most of their wealth invested in one particular firm might prefer 
a board composition associated with careful strategic decision-making; while more diversified 
investors might choose board structures associated with riskier investment decisions policies. 
(Eisenberg et al., 1998) 
Kiel and Nicholson (2003) examined the relationships between board size and firm performance 
in publicly traded large companies. It is concluded that board size is positively correlated with 
firm value. 
Dalton et al.(1999) found that there is a positive systematic relationship in a meta-analysis of 
board size and firm performance. 
On the other hand, Yermack (1996) states that there is an inverse relationship between board size 
and firm value, and that financial ratios related to profitability and operating efficiency appear to 
decline as board size grows. 
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This leads to the first research hypothesis: 
H1: There is a significant relationship between board size and firm performance 
Board Independence 
 
Rashid et al. (2010) realized the effects of board composition on company performance by 
developing two hypotheses to examine the relationship among composition of board 
memberships including independent directors and firm performance. Their results reveal that 
independent directors do not add value to the firm‘s economic performance, but they also 
mention independent directors might add benefits for greater transparency.  
Luan and Tang (2007) concluded that independent director appointments do have a significantly 
positive impact on a firm‘s performance, but questions whether the change in governance 
structure could result in performance implications. 
However, Yermack (1996) reports that firms with more outside directors displays lower 
performance when using Tobin‘s Q as a measurement. Similarly, Kiel and Nicholson (2003) 
found a negative relationship between firm performance and the proportion of outside directors.  
This prompts the second research hypothesis: 
H2: There is a significant relationship between board independence and firm performance 
Duality Separation 
The primary responsibility of a CEO is the implementation of strategic decisions and initiation of 
decision management. On the hand, the responsibility of the board of directors is to control, 
endorse and monitor such decisions pursued by the CEO (Sheikh & Wang, 2012). 
Fama and Jensen (1983) explain that the survival of organizations is characterized by the 
separation of ownership and control. Fama and Jensen clarifies that managerial decisions, 
without the implementation of control procedures, are more likely to make decisions that deviate 
from the interest of the firm. It is later explained that the implementation of an effective system 
for control procedures implies that the control of decisions, the entity or group responsible for 
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monitoring and ratification functions, is separated from the management decisions, which is 
responsible for the implementation and risk bearing functions. Such implementation is assists to 
regulate these agency problems by restricting and limiting the authority of managers and 
executives. 
Other supporting literature states that combining the roles of CEO and board chairman will give 
more power over board selection which allows greater influence and control over decision 
making (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Adams, Heitor Almeida, 
and Ferreira, 2005). 
Moreover, CEO duality restricts information dissemination towards board members which leads 
to the increase of agency costs of managerial decision making, hence, diminishing board 
effectiveness in promoting the corporations economic value (Dahya and McConnell, 2005; 
Nelson, 2005; Raheja, 2005). Similarly, Goyal and Park (2002) finds that the CEO turnover to 
corporate performance is lower when both titles are unified. 
On the other hand, CEO duality can be seen as a positive indicator leading to better corporate 
performance, because it is seen that the corporation has a clear leadership and vision that can 
properly direct the company. This is supported by the stewardship theory and the resource 
dependency theory, which states unifying the command by having roles of CEO and chairman 
held by the same person will facilitate effective actions that are taken by the CEO, which will 
lead to better firm performance and lead to better beneficial consequences on shareholder 
returns.  
The empirical evidence is that the ROE returns to shareholders are improved by combining the 
role of the CEO and chairman positions. Thus, the results fail to support agency theory and lean 
towards supporting the stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Gaur et al. (2015) 
argued that presence of directors and CEO duality leads to unification of control and command, 
and consequently higher performance. Moreover, Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) states that directors 
with more freedom of decision making are more likely to implement strategic decisions that will 
overcome organizational indolence, which suggests combining CEO and board of directors 
chairman will lease to less restrictions and pressures on the CEO during strategy implementation. 
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There is another view on CEO duality by ElSayed (2007), where it has no impact on corporate 
performance. Elsayed states, however, the impact of CEO duality on corporate performance is 
found to vary across different industries, a result that supports both agency theory and 
stewardship theory. In addition, when firms are categorized according to their financial 
performance, CEO duality attracts a positive and significant coefficient only when corporate 
performance is low. 
From a debt and leverage perspective, Abore (2007) finds that there is a positive significant 
relationship between CEO duality and firm leverage. Similarly, Bokpin and Arko (2009) states 
that there is positive relationship, however insignificant, between CEO duality and firm financial 
leverage suggesting that CEO‘s leans towards financing by debt rather than financing by equity 
when it comes to firm operation strategy. 
This prompts the third research hypothesis: 
H3: There is a significant relationship between CEO duality and firm performance 
Diversity 
 
A considerable amount of ambition towards increased gender diversity on boards will have 
significant "added value" effects and positive economic consequences. (Beaufort and Summers, 
2014). A study by Francoeur et al.(2008) stated that firms operating in complex environments 
that have a high percentage of women do witness positive returns. On the other hand, they state, 
having more women on corporate boards or on both corporate boards and top management does 
not seem to generate significant excess returns. 
Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) argued that the gender composition of a board can affect the 
quality of the monitoring role on the board and hence affects the financial performance of the 
firm. Economic arguments, on the other hand, are based on the proposition that firms which fail 
to select the most suitable candidates for the board of directors damage the firm‘s financial 
performance. Their findings demonstrate that the presence of women in particular on the board 
of directors does not affect firm value. However, they find that the diversity in general of the 
board has a positive impact on firm value. 
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Adams and Ferreira (2009) found that diversity has a positive impact on performance in firms 
that have weak board governance. In firms with strong governance, however, enforcing gender 
proportions in the board could eventually decrease shareholder value. A possible explanation is 
that greater gender diversity could lead to over monitoring within such firms.  
A different view has been established after exploring the strengths and limitations of various 
methodologies and survey findings, Rhode and Packel (2014) concludes that the relationship 
between diversity and financial performance has not been convincingly established. This leads us 
to the following hypothesis. 
This leads to the forth research hypothesis: 
H4: There is a significant relationship between board diversity and firm performance 
 
3.2 Ownership Structure  
Ownership structure is considered to be a key variable in corporate governance studies as it 
determines who handles the decision making power within a corporation (Zattoni, 2011).  
Ownership Concentration 
 
Omran et al. (2008) concluded that ownership concentration is a response to poor legal 
protection of investors, and has no significant effect on firms‘ performance. Similarly, findings 
by Warrad et al. (2013) concluded that non-managerial ownership concentrations on all levels do 
not have a statistical significant effect on firm performance either it is measured by ROA, ROE, 
or Tobin‘s Q. 
On the other hand, Wang et al. (2015) reports that ownership concentration has a negative 
relation with firm performance across different countries as a result of controlling shareholder 
agency problems or negative impacts on other corporate governance mechanisms arising from 
concentrated ownership. 
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Gaur et al. (2015) argued that a lack of ownership concentration leads to agency problems, 
resulting in poor performance. However, the positive effect of board independence on firm 
performance is reduced in firms that have a higher ownership concentration. This leads us to the 
following hypothesis. 
This leads to the fifth research hypothesis: 
H5: There is a significant relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance 
Director Ownership 
 
Different proxies for firm performance, accounting and market measures, produce different 
relationships with director ownership concentration. Bolbol et al. (2004) states that director 
ownership concentration on all levels does not have a statistical significant effect on neither 
ROA nor ROE, but has statistical significance on Tobin‘s Q. However, this result seems to 
depend more on reputation effects and lower agency costs than on market fundamentals affecting 
the firms‘ actual performance. Hence, future improvements in corporate governance practices are 
better evaluated through its effect on performance measures rather than market measures 
(Warrad et al., 2013). 
Drakos and Bekiris (2010) conducted an analysis for the same topic and found that when director 
ownership is treated as endogenous, a positive impact can be found on corporate value. Kamran 
and Shah (2014) states that director ownership has a positive impact on 372 firms from Pakistan 
which supports the understanding that mangers who are deeply-rooted in a firm are more 
influential in terms of corporate decisions that are skewed within their own interest. 
On the other hand, after controlling for investment intensity, leverage, growth and size, Mandaci 
and Gumu (2010) found that ownership concentration has a significantly positive effect on both 
firm value and profitability, while director ownership has a significantly negative effect on firm 
value. 
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Other evidence also indicates that the patterns of the relation between managerial ownership and 
firm performance, in the sense that the inflection points for the impact of managerial ownership 
turning from positive to negative, are markedly different across ownership managements (Chen, 
2006). 
From a debt and leverage perspective, there are empirical findings that conclude director 
ownership is positively related to debt ratio of firms, due to managers‘ financial alignment with 
outside shareholders which would pursue a levered capital structure which leads to an increase in 
firm value (Mehran, 1992; Berger et al., 1997). Moreover, Kim and Sorensen (1986) concluded 
that that firms with greater director ownership is more likely to have higher debt ratios compared 
to firms with minor director ownership. 
However, the excessive use of debt can cause bankruptcy risk and increase the non-diversifiable 
risk of bankruptcy to managers themselves. (Bathala et al., 1994) 
This prompts the sixth research hypothesis: 
H6: There is a significant relationship between director ownership and firm performance 
Institutional Ownership 
 
Alshammari (2015) reports that the effect of institutional owners is expected to positively 
moderate the relationship between common reporting standard (CSR) activities and firm 
performance.  
Literature reviews on institutional ownership states that it enhances institution‘s performance 
(Hartzell and Starks, 2003), and that it improves institutions performance (Maury, 2006), and 
that there is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and institution performance 
(Smith, 1996; Guercio and Hawkins, 1999). 
Elyasiani and Jia (2010) similarly found that there is a positive relationship between firm 
performance and institutional ownership stability. This relationship is robust to the employment 
of ownership turnover measures used in literature and consistent with the view that stable 
institutional shareholders play an important role in monitoring. Furthermore, better firm 
 36 
 
performance is observed when the long term institutional investors, particularly of foreign 
institutions, are higher (Hsu and Wang, 2014). A study by Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) also 
shows that the size of outside institutional stockholdings has a significant effect on the firm's 
capital structure. 
In a different twist, evidence suggests an endogeneity problem between firm performance and 
institutional ownership. However, the scale of the problem differs with respect to the 
concentration of ownership measure used. Results show that a more equal distribution of the 
voting power among the largest institutional stakeholder may result positive effects on firm 
performance. Consistent with the ownership structure in Finland, it has been found that a simple 
ownership concentration index does not influence firm performance (Bhattacharya et al., 2009). 
From a debt and leverage perspective, Bathala et al., (1994) found that institutional ownership is 
negatively related to the level of debt. Once institutional ownership and monitoring within firms 
increases, firms may find it ideal to employ minor levels of debt and managerial ownership in 
order to control for agency conflicts. (Bathala et al., 1994) 
This leads to the seventh hypothesis: 
H7: There is a significant relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance 
Foreign Ownership 
 
A study by Azzam et al. (2013) examined the effects of foreign ownership on debt, using the 
debt ratio, and company profitability, using ROE and ROA. The end-results indicated that 
foreign ownership has a significant and positive effect on debt, where it increases a company‘s 
access to more financing.  
The study also indicated that an increase in foreign ownership significantly improves firm 
performance using the measurements ROE and ROA, where foreign ownership increases 
financial performance up to a level and then declines there-after. A similar finding was also 
noted by Hintošová and Kubíková (2016). Similarly, a study by Ben Naceur et al. (2007) 
examined a sample of 95 firms in four countries which included three Arab countries, 
 37 
 
specifically Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and found a positive impact of foreign ownership on 
profit. 
Furthermore, studies regarding foreign ownership on firm performance for single counties show 
a positive effect in Belgium (Goethals and Ooghe, 1997), United Kingdom (Alan and Steve, 
2005), Egypt (Omran, 2009; Azzam et al. 2013) and Turkey (Gurbuz and Aybars, 2010). 
However, a study by Omran et al. (2008) sampled 304 companies from four Arab countries, 
Egypt, Jordan, Oman and Tunisia, and found no significance of foreign investing on firm 
performance. Yet another study by Omran (2009) later examined fifty two companies all present 
within Egypt, the study found that foreign ownership has a positive impact on firm performance. 
On the other hand, some studies revealed that foreign ownership has a negative on firm 
performance (Sulong & Nor, 2008; Khamis et al. 2015) suggesting the reason is due to the 
reduced amount of information between the foreign owners and management (Khamis et al. 
2015). 
This prompts the eighth research hypothesis: 
H8: There is a significant relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance 
3.3 Control Variables 
Firm Size 
 
Large sized firms have higher profitability and performance measures than small or medium 
sized firms. This could be the result of favorable advantages seized by monopoly power and not 
advantages gained through efficiency (Warrad et al., 2013). The results of a research by 
Nurcahyo et al. (2013) demonstrations that implementation of good corporate governance (GCG) 
can affect directly on corporate performance as measured by economic value added (EVA) as 
well as indirectly through firm size. Also, Azzam et al. (2013) shows that company size has a 
positive effect on ROE and ROA, where a company with a relatively larger size is comparatively 
more profitable than a company that is smaller in size. 
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On the other hand, Rashid et al. (2010) found that there is a negative relationship between 
company size as measured by assets and revenue and performance measurement of Tobin‘s Q, 
which is considered a market-value measurement of firm performance. Also, there are some very 
distinct relationships between company size and board composition. 
Firm size can impact large firms to experience issues of coordination and organization which 
may negatively influence performance (Williamson, 1967; Rashid et al. 2010). Williamson 
(1967) suggests that the increase in firm size may allow management to encounter control loss 
over the firm. Hence, the firm‘s management is considered to be a limitation to firm size, where 
if control loss occurs within the managerial hierarchy, this can greatly affect firm performance 
negatively.  Williamson (1967) also explains that managerial experience is positively related to 
firm size. Thus, non-experienced or unqualified management could negatively affect the growth 
of a firm, which leads to lower or inefficient firm performance. 
A study on firms in Pakistan by Sheikh & Wang (2012) finds that firm size is positively related 
to the debt ratio. This is supported by the static trade‐off model, a theory which allows a firm to 
understand its ability to finance with a certain balance between debt and equity, which suggests 
that large firms should borrow more due to their ability to diversify the risk and benefit from the 
tax shields on interest payments. 
Firm Age 
Loderer & Waelchli (2010) states that firm performance, specifically ROA, declines as firm age 
increases over time. However, even though this hypothesis is supported by the deterioration of 
corporate governance variables as well as having larger boards, this finding does not explain the 
full aging effect, where it seems to be relatively related to problems in ideas that should be 
implemented keeping the firm aligned with current industry standard practices. 
In terms of debt and leverage, a study by Pfaffermayr et al. (2013) found that firm age has a 
negative impact on debt ratios which indicate that older firms depends less on debt compared to 
younger firms. Similarly, Berger and Udell (1998) and Reid (2003) illustrated that a firm's debt 
ratio decreases when they pass their start-up phase period. Moreover, Coad et al. (2013) stated 
that ageing firms experience lower debt ratios. 
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Industry Type 
According to the signalling theory, companies within the same industry incline to adopt the same 
level of disclosure. When a firm within an industry tends not to follow the same disclosure 
practices as others within the same industry, then it may be interpreted as a signal that the firm is 
withholding negative vital information that might greatly affect investors‘ decisions (Craven and 
Marston, 1999). 
The difference in disclosure practices among firms present within different industries might be 
due to the fact each industry has different costs of disclosure and some firms may be more 
advanced in terms of technology than other firms (Ismail, 2002).  
Audit Type 
Audit firms audit or examine an organization‘s financial statements and express it opinion on the 
validity of such statements when being published. Hence, audited financial statements by audit 
firms should achieve a level of reliability when reviewing financial statements and presenting an 
honest opinion which the organizations‘ principles, shareholders and other stakeholder can rely 
on in order to make investment decisions. (Porter et al., 2008; Collin et al., 2013) 
Audit practice developments are considered to be more influenced by Big Four firms, which are 
the largest four auditing firms worldwide, rather than influenced by smaller local auditing firms. 
Hence, a Big Four firm could affect a firm‘s performance positively by leading the firm to 
implement proper routines and information systems. (Porter et al., 2008; Mohamed et al., 2013) 
In a different twist, Beisland et al. (2015) published a study that revealed the existence of internal 
auditors is related to stricter governance, whereas ‗Big Four‘ auditors are generally unrelated to 
corporate governance mechanisms. In situations which a significant relationship is present 
between audit quality and corporate governance does exist, the relationship is always positive. 
Macroeconomic Country Variables 
Increased economic and financial integration and macroeconomic fluctuations require that 
corporate managers pay more attention than in the past to the link between the "noise" that these 
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fluctuations represent and the company's future and past performance to obtain a much clearer 
picture of the company's core competitiveness and long term sustainability. 
The macroeconomic environment set can be viewed in different variables, such as exchange 
rates, inflation rates, and political risk premiums. (Oxelheim, 2003) 
Kenworthy (2005) stated that the most common measures of macroeconomic performance are 
economic growth and inflation, where economic growth can be measured in various ways, like 
gross domestic product and foreign direct investment. 
Bonomo et al. (2003) states that firms can see their financial condition deteriorate if a firm has 
foreign denominated debt and the real exchange rate of the country that the firm is based in 
depreciates. Also, financial condition of a firm could deteriorate if firms have significant short-
term debt or long-term debt contracted at floating rates instead of fixed rates, which will result in 
higher rates later on. 
Revolution 
Ghosh (2015) states that the effect of the Arab Spring is considered to be asymmetric, with little 
or no effects on certain countries, and from moderate to major effects in several countries. 
However, Mousavi & Ouenniche (2014) states that the MENA region is considered to be the 
most critical areas in the world to the degree that the political conflicts of the Arab Spring 
uprising that occurred within the region had an impact not only on the financial markets within 
the area, but also on global financial markets as well. 
 
An area that has not been sufficiently and effectively explored has been the impact of the Arab 
Spring uprising on corporate governance and firm performance within the region.  
Ghosh (2015) explored MENA banks located in twelve countries during 2000-2012 and found 
that the impact of the Arab Spring uprising led to a reduction in bank profitability and increase in 
bank risk. A dummy variable is used to account for the years before the Arab Spring uprising 
(2006-2010) and after the Arab Spring uprising (2011-2015) in order to test for the significance 
on firm performance.  
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4. Methodology 
 
4.1.1 Population and Sample Selection 
 
For the purpose of carrying out the research and collecting the data, this study‘s sample 
comprises firms listed on the S&P Pan Arab Composite Index which includes the largest 
companies within the Arab countries in terms of market capitalization in USD. The population of 
the study consists of firms that are publicly listed in the stock exchanges. All financial firms, 
including banks, are excluded from the population sample, whereas such firms are considered to 
be a regulated industry and are highly likely to have fundamentally different cash flow and 
accrual processes. The sample comprises the top 225 companies in stock exchanges of 11 
countries after excluding financial companies. 
Table (1) - Sample Distribution by Sectors
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Table (1) shows classification of the sample per the Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS) which is an industry classification by industry group and sector based on business 
activity of each firm. The GICS is developed by MSCI, a US based firm that provides investment 
analysis tools and Standard & Poor's (S&P) for use by global financial institutions. The GICS 
structure consists of 10 sectors, 24 industry groups, 67 industries and 156 sub-industries. 
GICS Sector Name Frequency % 
Consumer Discretionary (25) 29 12.89% 
Consumer Staples (30) 27 12.00% 
Energy (10) 14 6.22% 
Health Care (35) 9 4.00% 
Industrials (20) 52 23.11% 
Information Technology (45) 1 0.44% 
Materials (15) 66 29.33% 
Telecommunication Services (50) 18 8.00% 
Utilities (55) 9 4.00% 
Total 225 100% 
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Table (2) - Sample Distribution by Country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.2 Index Methodology 
S&P Pan Arab Composite Index which is designed to reflect the float available to Gulf 
Cooperation Council residents, which is considered to be larger than the free float available to 
foreigners. 
Float factors generally reduce the number of total shares outstanding in the index calculation to 
reflect shares available to all investors. In addition to reviewing the amounts held by private, 
corporate or government entities, S&P Dow Jones Indices also accounts for any limits or 
restrictions on investments by foreign investors or entities. These restrictions may be imposed by 
local governments on specific industries or on all public securities. Restrictions may also be 
imposed on foreign investors by individual companies, as part of their internal bylaws. 
4.1.3 Eligibility Factors Float-Adjustment 
A stock‘s weight in an index is determined by its float-adjusted market capitalization. The 
methodology to calculate float factors is the same as described in S&P Dow Jones Indices‘ Float 
Adjustment Methodology. However, most companies within the GCC region have multiple 
guidelines used to determine the relevant float factor for each index. Float factors generally 
reduce the number of total shares outstanding in the index calculation to reflect shares available 
Country 
Number of 
companies 
% 
Bahrain 3 1.33% 
Egypt 15 6.67% 
Jordan 8 3.56% 
Kuwait 22 9.78% 
Lebanon 1 0.44% 
Morocco 7 3.11% 
Oman 15 6.67% 
Qatar 15 6.67% 
Saudi Arabia 105 46.67% 
Tunisia 17 7.56% 
United Arab Emirates 17 7.56% 
Total 225 100% 
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to all investors. In addition to reviewing the amounts held by private, corporate or government 
entities, S&P Dow Jones Indices also accounts for any limits or restrictions on investments by 
foreign investors or entities. These restrictions may be imposed by local governments on specific 
industries or on all public securities. Restrictions may also be imposed on foreign investors by 
individual companies, as part of their internal bylaws. All GCC markets have different levels of 
foreign investment restrictions depending on the investor: one level indicating what is available 
for investors residing within the GCC region; and the other for foreign investors. Typically, the 
amounts available to GCC residents are larger than those available to foreign investors. 
4.2 Data Collection 
Companies chosen will be selected from the S&P Pan Arab Composite, which consist of 11 
countries and stock markets after excluding financial firms, which are Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
The data collected is a panel data for ten years from 2006 to 2015. The data is used to compare 
the effect of corporate governance on firm performance in the five years before the revolution of 
Arab spring to the five years after the revolution. The data was collected from Orbis database, 
Reuters Eikon, DataStream, Zawya, and annual reports will also be used to further gather 
information. The frequency of the data is annual.        
4.3 Measurement of Variables 
Within this study, the independent variables used are return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), 
and the debt ratio (DR), where the ratios demonstrated are used extensively in literature reviews as 
measurements of profits. The ROA measurement is calculated as the ratio of net income to total 
assets or net income divided by total assets, which shows the ability of a firm in generating income 
from its assets. The ROE measurement is defined as the ratio of net income to total equity, which 
demonstrates the efficiency of using shareholders' equity in generating profits for the firm. The DR 
measurement is calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets, which describes the leverage of the 
firm. 
The independent variables used are board size, board independence, CEO duality separation, 
diversity, ownership concentration, director ownership, institutional ownership and foreign 
ownership. The board size variable measures the total number of board of directors within a firm. The 
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board independence variable measures the total number of non-executive directors compared to the 
total number of board of directors within a firm. The CEO duality separation variable represents if a 
person shares dual position of CEO and chairman within a firm. The diversity variable signifies the 
total number of female directors present within a firms‘ board. The ownership concentration denotes 
the percentage of all shareholder ownership within the firm who owns shares that add up to 5% or 
more, and excludes any other shareholder ownership representing less than 5% ownership. 
 
Furthermore, the director ownership variable is the percentage of all shareholder ownership who are 
directors within the firm who owns shares that add up to 5% or more, and excludes any other director 
shareholder ownership representing less than 5% ownership. The institutional variable is the 
percentage of all shareholder ownership who are institution within the firm who owns shares that add 
up to 5% or more, and excludes any other institution shareholder ownership representing less than 
5% ownership. The foreign ownership is the percentage of all shareholder ownership who are foreign 
within the firm who owns shares that add up to 5% or more, and excludes any other foreign 
shareholders ownership representing less than 5% ownership. 
 
The control variables used are firm size, firm age, industry type, auditor type, gross domestic product 
(GDP), foreign exchange rate (FX), inward foreign direct investment, outward foreign direct 
investment and revolution. The firm age variable signifies the natural log of total assets within a firm. 
The firm age variable represents the natural log of the number of years since the firm‘s foundation. 
The industry type variable indicates whether the firm is operating under a service or manufacturing 
industry. 
The GDP, FX, Inward FDI, Outward FDI variables are used for the country that the firm is based in. 
The GDP variable is the gross domestic product of the country that the firm is based in. The Foreign 
Exchange Rate variable is exchange rate of the country‘s currency that the firm is based in when 
compared to USD. Inward FDI signifies investment by a foreign entity in production in the reporting 
country, either by buying part or all of a company or by establishing new operations. FDI is longer-
term and more permanent that stock market investments, and includes an element of business control. 
This is expressed as a share of total investment in the country. On the other hand, the Outward FDI 
signifies the investment by an entity from reporting country in production abroad, either by buying 
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part or all of a company or establishing new operations. FDI is longer-term and more permanent that 
stock market investments, and includes an element of business control. 
 
Finally, the revolution variable indicates either the Arab Spring revolution has occurred during/after 
or before the year 2011, which is considered the starting date of the Arab Spring uprising, in order to 
examine its effects on firm performance. 
 
Table (3) shows the symbols, definitions and measurements of the aforementioned variables. The 
table is divided into three groups, where the first one is related to dependent variables, the second 
group concerns with independent variables and the last group is consists of control variables 
including the revolution variable as well as the macroeconomics variables. 
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Table (3) - Definition and Measurement of Variables 
Symbol Variable Definition Measurement 
Dependent Variables 
ROA Return on Assets Net Income divided by Total Assets 
ROE Return on Equity Net Income divided by Total Equity 
DR Debt Ratio Ratio of Total Debt to Total Assets 
Independent Variables (Determinants) 
BrdSize Board Size Number of Board of Directors 
BrdIndp Board Independence Number of Non-Executive Directors divided by Board Size. 
DualSep 
 
CEO Duality Separation If the CEO and Chairman are the same person = 0;  
otherwise = 1 
Div Diversity Number of female directors that exists on board 
 
OwnCon Ownership Concentration Adding up all share ratios of shareholders who have 5% or 
more (excluding others) 
DirOwn 
 
Director Ownership 
 
Adding up all share ratios of shareholders that includes 
directors only who have 5% or more (excluding others) 
InstOwn 
 
Institutional Ownership 
 
Adding up all share ratios of shareholders that includes 
institutions only who have 5% or more (excluding others) 
FrngOwn Foreign Ownership Adding up all share ratios of shareholders (institutions and 
individuals) that are foreign only who have 5% or more 
(excluding others) 
Control Variables 
FrmSize 
 
Firm Size                                               Natural Log of Total Assets 
 
FrmAge Firm Age Natural log of the number of years since the firm‘s foundation 
IndType Industry Type Manufacturing = 1; Services = 2 2;  
 
AudType Auditor Type If ‗Big 4‘ = 1; otherwise = 0 
GDP Gross Domestic Product GDP of the country the firm is based in (USD Standardized) 
FX Foreign exchange rate Exchange rate of the country the firm is based in to USD 
FDII Inward Foreign Direct 
Investment  
Inward FDI of the country the firm is based in 
FDIO Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment  
Outward FDI of the country the firm is based in 
Rev Revolution If year is before Arab Spring = 0; If during or after = 1 
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4.4 Research Method 
To test the research hypotheses outlined in section 2, regression analysis will be adopted by 
using the statistical package (SPSS). The data is then used to compare the corporate governance 
variables five years before the Arab Spring uprising to the five years during/after the uprising, 
using the Mann-Wittney Test. 
 
The following models will be used as follows: 
 
Model 1: ROA = α + β1 BrdSize + β2 BrdIndp + β3 DualSep +β4 Div+ β5 OwnCon + β6 DirOwn 
+ β7 InstOwn + β8 ForgnOwn + β9 FrmSize + β10 FrmAge + β11 IndType + β12 AudType+ β13 
Rev+ β14 GDP + β15 FX + β16 FDIO + β17 FDII + ε  
 
Model 2: ROE = α + β1 BrdSize + β2 BrdIndp + β3 Duality +β4 Div+ β5 OwnCon + β6 DirOwn 
+ β7 InstOwn + β8 ForgnOwn + β9 FrmSize + β10 FrmAge + β11 IndType + β12 AudType+ β13 
Rev+ β14 GDP + β15 FX + β16 FDIO + β17 FDII + ε 
 
Model 3: DR = α + β1 BrdSize + β2 BrdIndp + β3 Duality +β4 Div+ β5 OwnCon + β6 DirOwn + 
β7 InstOwn + β8 ForgnOwn + β9 FrmSize + β10 FrmAge + β11 IndType + β12 AudType+ β13 Rev+ 
β14 GDP + β15 FX + β16 FDIO + β17 FDII + ε 
 
 
The following hypotheses were developed in order to examine the effect of corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm performance: 
 
 Table (4): Hypothesis Development 
 
Board Size H1: There is a significant relationship between 
board size and firm performance 
Board Independence H2: There is a significant relationship between 
board independence and firm performance 
CEO Duality Separation H3: There is a significant relationship between 
CEO duality separation and firm performance 
Board Diversity H4: There is a significant relationship between 
board diversity and firm performance 
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Ownership Concentration H5: There is a significant relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance 
Director Ownership H6: There is a significant relationship between 
director ownership and firm performance 
Institutional Ownership H7: There is a significant relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm performance 
Foreign Ownership H8: There is a significant relationship between 
foreign ownership and firm performance 
Firm Size H9: There is a significant relationship between 
firm size and firm performance 
Firm Age H10: There is a significant relationship 
between firm age and firm performance 
Industry Type H11: There is a significant relationship 
between industry type and firm performance 
Audit Type H12: There is a significant relationship 
between audit type and firm performance 
Revolution H13: There is a significant relationship 
between revolution and firm performance 
Gross Domestic Product H14: There is a significant relationship 
between GDP and firm performance 
Foreign Exchange Rate H15: There is a significant relationship 
between FX and firm performance 
Outward Foreign Direct Investment H16: There is a significant relationship 
between outward FDI and firm performance 
Inward Foreign Direct Investment H17: There is a significant relationship 
between Inward FDI and firm performance 
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CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
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5. Findings and analysis 
 
5.1 Descriptive Analysis and Hypotheses Testing 
 
To study the effect of the corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance, three 
econometric models are used in order to test for the seventeen hypotheses previously mentioned. 
The regression analysis tool on SPSS is used to test for the effect of the independent variables, 
which are board size, board independence, CEO duality separation, diversity, ownership 
concentration, director ownership, institutional ownership and foreign ownership, firm size, firm 
age, industry type, auditor type, GDP, Outward FDI, Inward FDI and a Revolution dummy 
variable over the dependent variables; Return on assets, Return on equity and Debt ratio. 
Model 1 is used in order to test the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on firm 
performance using ROA. Model 2 is used to test the effects of corporate governance mechanisms 
on firm performance using ROE. Finally, Model 3 is used in order to test the effects of corporate 
governance mechanisms on firm performance using Debt ratio. The three models tests for the 
hypotheses mentioned from H1 to H17. 
Each model is followed by three tables which are coefficients for dependent variable, model 
summary for dependent variable and ANOVA for dependent variable. 
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Table (5) illustrates the minimum, maximum, mean, dispersion around the mean and the variance 
for each of the variables. Table (5) shows the descriptive statistics findings, the central tendency 
and dispersion of the indicators.  
 
 
Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Variance 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Statistic 
ROA -67.8120- 43.9800 7.749656 .2106361 9.0180793 81.326 
ROE -329.9030- 76.7310 13.032447 .4616504 19.6946789 387.880 
DR .0000 1.4979 .424217 .0053599 .2299131 .053 
Board Size 3 20 8.35 .054 2.208 4.876 
Board Independence .1667 1.0000 .792200 .0051595 .2110372 .045 
CEO Duality 0 1 .94 .006 .242 .058 
Diversity 0 5 .19 .015 .595 .354 
Ownership 
Concentration 
.0000 100.0000 32.602246 .7777860 36.4731069 1330.288 
Director Ownership .0000 100.0000 3.414547 .2107103 9.8719530 97.455 
Institutional Ownership .0000 100.0000 21.755883 .6085482 28.5304645 813.987 
Foreign Ownership .0000 100.0000 4.037387 .2845185 13.3116965 177.201 
Firm Size 9.5654 23.1496 13.322025 .0371778 1.5951851 2.545 
Firm Age 0 161 25.37 .429 20.055 402.200 
Industry Type 1 2 1.38 .010 .485 .235 
Auditor Type 0 1 .72 .010 .449 .201 
Revolution 0 1 .50 .011 .500 .250 
GDP 10.873 753.659 350.71274 6.033875 265.970033 70740.058 
FX .0007 3.7552 .833168 .0233193 1.1061296 1.224 
FDIO -.42- 23.54 3.5918 .06393 3.03244 9.196 
FDII -1.46- 92.48 15.1379 .26160 12.40890 153.981 
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5.2.1 Model 1 
 
ROA = α + β1 BrdSize + β2 BrdIndp + β3 Duality +β4 Div+ β5 OwnCon + β6 DirOwn + β7 
InstOwn + β8 ForgnOwn + β9 FrmSize + β10 FrmAge + β11 IndType + β12 AudType+ β13 Rev+ 
β14 GDP + β15 FX + β16 FDIO + β17 FDII + ε  
 
Table (6-1) – Coefficients for dependent variable ROA 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 15.603 3.121  4.999 .000 
BrdSize .616 .123 .155 4.994 .000 
BrdIndp -1.517- 1.338 -.036- -1.134- .257 
DualSep -2.828- 1.121 -.082- -2.522- .012 
Divers -.030- .443 -.002- -.068- .946 
OwnCon -.001- .011 -.005- -.118- .906 
DirOwn .041 .026 .047 1.549 .122 
InstOwn .067 .015 .215 4.611 .000 
ForgnOwn -.054- .021 -.077- -2.543- .011 
FrmSize -.926- .188 -.155- -4.928- .000 
FrmAge .022 .013 .047 1.627 .104 
IndustryType -.344- .537 -.018- -.640- .522 
AudType 1.405 .631 .068 2.227 .026 
FX .412 .281 .052 1.465 .143 
FDIO .601 .352 .199 1.707 .088 
FDII -.129- .084 -.171- -1.539- .124 
Rev -2.012- .695 -.109- -2.895- .004 
GDP .002 .001 .069 1.887 .059 
 
Table (6-2) – Model Summary for dependent variable ROA 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .288 .083 .071 8.7516857 
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Table (6-3) – ANOVA for dependent variable ROA 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 8955.365 17 526.786 6.878 .000 
Residual 98956.868 1292 76.592   
Total 107912.233 1309    
 
Model 1 examines the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance 
measured by ROA. The model is highly significant with F-statistics which is equal to 6.878 and 
the p – value equals to 0.000 (less than 1%). The independent variables of the same model 
accounts for 8.3%variations in the dependent variable as indicated R
2
. 
Board size 
Board size appears to have a positive relationship and statistically significant at a 0.000 
significance level with firm performance when measured by ROA. This result is consistent with 
previous studies demonstrating that there is a significant positive relationship between board size 
and financial performance. (Dalton et al., 1999; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). 
From a resource dependence theory point of view, a bigger board leads to greater opportunity for 
more relationships, associations, contacts and links and which allows access to resources. 
(Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Hillman et al. (2000) also 
agrees that directors are considered resourceful towards the firm by providing skills and 
expertise needed, as well as, access to suppliers, clients and policymakers. 
Even though Yermack (1996) states that there is an inverse relationship between board size and 
firm value, however, the count of directors adds additional skilled expertise and performance to 
the board until it reaches a certain level where the board size outweighs the additional benefits 
that is provided. This raises the possibility that there is an inverted relationship between board 
size and firm performance. (Jensen, 1993; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Furthermore, Dalton et 
al.(1999) states that there is a positive systematic relationship between board size and firm 
performance. 
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From an agency theory perspective, boards with larger number of members can exercise better 
regulation and control on managers than smaller boards. (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995; Donaldson, 1999) 
Duality Separation 
CEO duality separation appears to have a negative relationship and statistically significant at a 
0.012 significance level with firm performance when measured by ROA due to the separation of 
chairman and CEO responsibilities. Unifying CEO-Chairman positions is common within Pan 
Arab countries, especially in family controlled firm, and is considered to be a Gulf phenomenon. 
This result is consistent with and supported by the stewardship theory and the resource 
dependency theory, which states unifying the command by having roles of CEO and chairman 
held by the same person will facilitate effective actions that are taken by the CEO, which will 
lead to better firm performance and lead to better beneficial consequences on shareholder 
returns. Hence, CEO duality can be seen as a positive indicator leading to better corporate 
performance, because it is seen that the corporation has a clear leadership and vision that can 
properly direct the company. 
Empirical evidence is also consistent with literature review where that the ROE returns to 
shareholders are improved by combining the role of the CEO and chairman positions. Thus, the 
results fail to support agency theory and lean towards supporting the stewardship theory 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Gaur et al. (2015) argued that presence of directors and CEO 
duality leads to unification of control and command, and consequently higher performance. 
Moreover, Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) states that directors with more freedom of decision making 
are more likely to implement strategic decisions that will overcome organizational indolence, 
which suggests combining CEO and board of directors chairman will lease to less restrictions 
and pressures on the CEO during strategy implementation. 
Institutional ownership 
Institutional ownership appears to have a positive relationship and statistically significant at a 
0.000 significance level with firm performance when measured by ROA. The result is consistent 
with previous studies suggesting that institutional ownership has a positive effect on firm 
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performance (Smith, 1996; Guercio and Hawkins, 1999; Elyasiani and Jia, 2010; Alshammari, 
2015) and that it enhances and improves firm performance (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Maury, 
2006). This shows that institutional investors contributes by not only providing financial 
investment resources, but also providing non-financial resources such as managerial and 
industrial expertise and technical resources in which improves the firm‘s profitability and 
performance on the long run which limits potential agency problems. (Douma, George, & Kabir, 
2006; Chahine & Tohme, 2009; Al-Musalli and Ismail, 2012) 
Foreign ownership 
Foreign ownership appears to have a negative relationship and statistically significant at a 0.011 
significance level with firm performance when measured by ROA. The result is consistent with 
previous studies suggesting that some studies revealed that foreign ownership has a negative on 
firm performance (Sulong & Nor, 2008; Khamis et al. 2015). The reason is due to the reduced 
amount of information between the foreign owners and management (Khamis et al. 2015).  
Firm size 
Firm size appears to have a negative relationship and statistically significant at a 0.000 
significance level with firm performance when measured by ROA. This result is consistent with 
firm size can impact large firms to experience issues of coordination and organization which may 
negatively influence performance (Williamson, 1967; Rashid et al. 2010). 
Williamson (1967) suggests that the increase in firm size may allow management to encounter 
control loss over the firm. Hence, the firm‘s management can impact firm performance 
negatively when control loss occurs within the managerial hierarchy.  Furthermore, Williamson 
(1967) also states that managerial experience is positively related to firm size. Thus, non-
experienced or unqualified management could negatively affect the growth of a firm, which 
leads to lower or inefficient firm performance. 
Additionally, Rashid et al. (2010) indicates a negative relationship between company size, when 
measured by assets and revenue,  and a market performance measurement of Tobin‘s Q. 
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Audit type 
Audit type appears to have a positive relationship and statistically significant at a 0.026 
significance level with firm performance when measured by ROA when company hires a Big 
Four to audit its financials. This result is consistent with Beisland et al. (2015) where it is 
revealed that in situations which a significant relationship is present between audit quality and 
corporate governance does exist, the relationship is always positive. 
Also, the result shows that Big Four firm could affect a firm‘s performance positively by leading 
the firm to implement proper routines and information systems. (Porter et al., 2008; Mohamed et 
al., 2013) 
Revolution 
Revolution appears to have a negative relationship and statistically significant at a 0.004 
significance level with firm performance when measured by ROA. This shows that the Arab 
Spring uprising negatively affected firm performance in terms of ROA measurement. 
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5.2.2 Model 2 
 
ROE = α + β1 BrdSize + β2 BrdIndp + β3 Dualit y +β4 Div+ β5 OwnCon + β6 DirOwn + β7 
InstOwn + β8 ForgnOwn + β9 FrmSize + β10 FrmAge + β11 IndType + β12 AudType+ β13 Rev+ 
β14 GDP + β15 FX + β16 FDIO + β17 FDII + ε 
 
Table (7-1) – Coefficients for dependent variable ROE 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 22.129 7.443  2.973 .003 
BrdSize .914 .296 .099 3.087 .002 
BrdIndp -2.924- 3.203 -.029- -.913- .362 
DualSep -8.706- 2.674 -.108- -3.257- .001 
Divers -.928- 1.056 -.029- -.879- .380 
OwnCon .014 .027 .024 .507 .612 
DirOwn .079 .063 .039 1.266 .206 
InstOwn .086 .035 .117 2.470 .014 
ForgnOwn .003 .051 .002 .067 .946 
FrmSize -.902- .449 -.065- -2.011- .045 
FrmAge .003 .032 .003 .099 .921 
IndustryType -.680- 1.285 -.015- -.529- .597 
AudType 4.878 1.504 .102 3.244 .001 
FX .747 .675 .040 1.107 .268 
FDIO 1.022 .849 .145 1.204 .229 
FDII -.257- .203 -.146- -1.265- .206 
Rev -5.097- 1.663 -.118- -3.065- .002 
GDP .005 .003 .064 1.700 .089 
 
 
Table (7-2) – Model Summary for dependent variable ROE 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .216 .047 .036 20.1596923 
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Table (7-3) – ANOVA for dependent variable ROE 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 28344.373 16 1771.523 4.359 .000 
Residual 577919.559 1422 406.413   
Total 606263.932 1438    
 
Model 2 examines the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance 
measured by ROE. The model is highly significant with F-statistics which is equal to 4.359 and 
the p – value equals to 0.000 (less than 1%). The independent variables of the same model 
accounts for 4.7%variations in the dependent variable as indicated R
2
. 
Board size 
Board size appears to have a positive relationship and statistically significant at a 0.002 
significance level with firm performance when measured by ROE. This result is consistent with 
previous studies demonstrating that there is a significant positive relationship between board size 
and financial performance. (Dalton et al.,1999; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). 
From a resource dependence theory point of view, a bigger board leads to greater opportunity for 
more relationships, associations, contacts and links and which allows access to resources. 
(Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Hillman et al. (2000) also 
agrees that directors are considered resourceful towards the firm by providing skills and 
expertise needed, as well as, access to suppliers, clients and policymakers. 
Even though Yermack (1996) states that there is an inverse relationship between board size and 
firm value, however, the count of directors adds additional skilled expertise and performance to 
the board until it reaches a certain level where the board size outweighs the additional benefits 
that is provided. This raises the possibility that there is an inverted relationship between board 
size and firm performance. (Jensen, 1993; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Furthermore, Dalton et 
al.(1999) states that there is a positive systematic relationship between board size and firm 
performance. 
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From an agency theory perspective, boards with larger number of members can exercise better 
regulation and control on managers than smaller boards. (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995; Donaldson, 1999) 
Duality Separation 
Duality appears to have a negative relationship and statistically significant at a 0.001 significance 
level with firm performance when measured by ROE due to the separation of chairman and CEO 
responsibilities. Unifying CEO-Chairman positions is common within Pan Arab countries, 
especially in family controlled firm, and is considered to be a Gulf phenomenon. 
This result is consistent with and supported by the stewardship theory and the resource 
dependency theory, which states unifying the command by having roles of CEO and chairman 
held by the same person will facilitate effective actions that are taken by the CEO, which will 
lead to better firm performance and lead to better beneficial consequences on shareholder 
returns. Hence, CEO duality can be seen as a positive indicator leading to better corporate 
performance, because it is seen that the corporation has a clear leadership and vision that can 
properly direct the company. 
Empirical evidence is also consistent with literature review where that the ROE returns to 
shareholders are improved by combining the role of the CEO and chairman positions. Thus, the 
results fail to support agency theory and lean towards supporting the stewardship theory 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Gaur et al. (2015) argued that presence of directors and CEO 
duality leads to unification of control and command, and consequently higher performance. 
Moreover, Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) states that directors with more freedom of decision making 
are more likely to implement strategic decisions that will overcome organizational indolence, 
which suggests combining CEO and board of directors chairman will lease to less restrictions 
and pressures on the CEO during strategy implementation. 
Institutional ownership 
Institutional ownership appears to have a positive relationship and statistically significant at a 
0.014 significance level with firm performance when measured by ROE. The result is consistent 
with previous studies suggesting that institutional ownership has a positive effect on firm 
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performance (Smith, 1996; Guercio and Hawkins, 1999; Elyasiani and Jia, 2010; Alshammari, 
2015) and that it enhances and improves firm performance (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Maury, 
2006). This shows that institutional investors contributes by not only providing financial 
investment resources, but also providing non-financial resources such as managerial and 
industrial expertise and technical resources in which improves the firm‘s profitability and 
performance on the long run which limits potential agency problems. (Douma, George, & Kabir, 
2006; Chahine & Tohme, 2009; Al-Musalli and Ismail, 2012) 
Firm size 
Firm size appears to have a negative relationship and statistically significant at a 0.045 
significance level with firm performance when measured by ROE. This result is consistent with 
firm size can impact large firms to experience issues of coordination and organization which may 
negatively influence performance (Williamson, 1967; Rashid et al. 2010). 
Williamson (1967) suggests that the increase in firm size may allow management to encounter 
control loss over the firm. Hence, the firm‘s management can impact firm performance 
negatively when control loss occurs within the managerial hierarchy.  Furthermore, Williamson 
(1967) also states that managerial experience is positively related to firm size. Thus, non-
experienced or unqualified management could negatively affect the growth of a firm, which 
leads to lower or inefficient firm performance. 
Additionally, Rashid et al. (2010) indicates a negative relationship between company size, when 
measured by assets and revenue,  and a market performance measurement of Tobin‘s Q. 
Audit type 
Firm size appears to have a positive relationship and statistically significant at a 0.001 
significance level with firm performance when measured by ROE when company hires a Big 
Four to audit its financials. This result is consistent with Beisland et al. (2015) where it is 
revealed that in situations which a significant relationship is present between audit quality and 
corporate governance does exist, the relationship is always positive. 
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Also, the result shows that Big Four firm could affect a firm‘s performance positively by leading 
the firm to implement proper routines and information systems. (Porter et al., 2008; Mohamed et 
al., 2013) 
Revolution 
Revolution appears to have a negative relationship and statistically significant at a 0.002 
significance level with firm performance when measured by ROE. This shows that the Arab 
Spring uprisings negatively affected firm performance in terms of ROE measurement. 
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5.2.3 Model 3 
 
DR = α + β1 BrdSize + β2 BrdIndp + β3 Duality +β4 Div+ β5 OwnCon + β6 DirOwn + β7 
InstOwn + β8 ForgnOwn + β9 FrmSize + β10 FrmAge + β11 IndType + β12 AudType+ β13 Rev+ 
β14 GDP + β15 FX + β16 FDIO + β17 FDII + ε 
 
Table (8-1) – Coefficients for dependent variable DR 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -.210- .074  -2.839- .005 
BrdSize -.005- .003 -.053- -1.820- .069 
BrdIndp -.043- .032 -.039- -1.340- .180 
DualSep -.093- .027 -.103- -3.422- .001 
Divers .015 .011 .043 1.424 .155 
OwnCon 2.245E-5 .000 .003 .083 .934 
DirOwn .002 .001 .078 2.738 .006 
InstOwn -.001- .000 -.099- -2.279- .023 
ForgnOwn .002 .001 .123 4.414 .000 
FrmSize .054 .004 .357 12.429 .000 
FrmAge -.001- .000 -.068- -2.537- .011 
IndustryType -.020- .013 -.042- -1.574- .116 
AudType .074 .015 .139 4.895 .000 
FX .015 .007 .073 2.211 .027 
FDIO .008 .009 .107 .993 .321 
FDII .000 .002 -.012- -.118- .906 
Rev .034 .017 .071 2.033 .042 
GDP -1.194E-5 .000 -.014- -.411- .681 
 
 
Table (8-2) – Model Summary for dependent variable DR 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .453 .205 .194 .2122263 
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Table (8-3) – ANOVA for dependent variable DR 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 15.042 17 .885 19.646 .000 
Residual 58.372 1296 .045   
Total 73.414 1313    
 
 
Model 3 examines the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance 
measured by ROE. The model is highly significant with F-statistics which is equal to 19.646 and 
the p – value equals to 0.000 (less than 1%). The independent variables of the same model 
accounts for 20.5%variations in the dependent variable as indicated R
2
. 
Duality Separation 
Duality appears to have a negative relationship and statistically significant at a 0.001 significance 
level with firm performance when measured by DR due to the separation of chairman and CEO 
responsibilities. Unifying CEO-Chairman positions is common within Pan Arab countries, 
especially in family controlled firm, and is considered to be a Gulf phenomenon. 
This result is consistent with Abore (2007) which finds that there is a positive significant 
relationship between CEO duality and firm leverage. Similarly, Bokpin and Arko (2009) states 
that there is positive relationship, however insignificant, between CEO duality and firm financial 
leverage suggesting that CEO‘s leans towards financing by debt rather than financing by equity 
when it comes to firm operation strategy. 
In theory, CEO duality restricts information dissemination towards board members which leads 
to the increase of agency costs of managerial decision making which leads to the diminishing 
board effectiveness in promoting the corporations economic value. (Nelson, 2005; Dahya and 
McConnell, 2005; Raheja, 2005) 
This leads to the recommendation that the survival of organizations is characterized by the 
separation of ownership and control (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
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Director ownership 
Director ownership appears to have a positive relationship and statistically significant at a 0.006 
significance level with firm performance when measured by DR. This result is consistent with 
previous studies suggesting that director ownership is positively related to debt ratio of firms, 
due to managers‘ financial alignment with outside shareholders which would pursue a levered 
capital structure which leads to an increase in firm value (Mehran, 1992; Berger et al., 1997). 
Moreover, Kim and Sorensen (1986) concluded that that firms with greater director ownership is 
more likely to have higher debt ratios compared to firms with minor director ownership. 
Moreover, Kamran and Shah (2014) states that director ownership has a positive impact on 
Pakistani firms, which supports the understanding mangers that are deeply rooted in a firm are 
more influential in terms of corporate decisions that are skewed within their own interest. 
Also, this result is consistent with the shareholder theory which explains the ultimate goal for 
managers is to use the capital for organizations with a main purpose to increase the returns of the 
firm, which in response increases the return of the shareholders. Director ownership is 
considered as a control mechanism that may rationalize the managerial decisions of directors, 
reduce their moral hazard towards the firm and encourage directors to work more effectively and 
efficiently, such change in managerial behaviors is as a result of the interest of managers has 
become more aligned with the interest of shareholders as well as reducing agency costs. 
(Bathala, 1994) 
Institutional ownership 
Institutional ownership appears to have a negative relationship and statistically significant at a 
0.023 significance level with firm performance when measured by DR. This result is consistent 
with Bathala et al., (1994) which found that institutional ownership is negatively related to the 
level of debt. Furthermore, once institutional ownership and monitoring within firms increases, 
firms may find it ideal to employ minor levels of debt and managerial ownership in order to 
control for agency conflicts. (Bathala et al., 1994) 
 
 66 
 
Foreign ownership 
Foreign ownership appears to have a positive relationship and statistically significant at a 0.000 
significance level with firm performance when measured by DR. This result is consistent with 
Azzam et al. (2013) when examined the effect of foreign ownership on debt showing a positive 
significant relationship. The explanation for this is that foreign investors improve firm's 
accessibility to finance as the more foreign owners has more shares in the firm.  
Foreign shareholders are considered to be long-term investors that brings along their own vast 
international expertise and implements organizational and monitoring capabilities within the 
investee-firms people. Such implementation is likely to inspire new managerial style, which 
creates mutual trust and collaboration between managers and employees, and hence improves the 
firm performance (Chahine & Tohme, 2010; Al-Musalli & Ismail, 2012).  
Hence, from a resource dependency theory perspective, foreign investors can be regarded as a 
competitive advantage for a firm when compared to firms with local investors where foreign 
investors are recognized as providers of resources that are needed for an organization, which 
further proves that the board of directors is considered to be an important mechanism that links 
an organization with the external environment (Chahine & Tohme, 2010; Al-Musalli & Ismail, 
2012; Hambrick et al., 2015). 
Firm size 
Firm size appears to have a positive relationship and statistically significant at a 0.000 
significance level with firm performance when measured by DR. This result is consistent with 
Sheikh & Wang (2012) on their study regarding firms in Pakistan. They find that firm size is 
positively related to the debt ratio, which is supported by the static trade‐off model, suggesting 
that large firms should borrow more due to their ability to diversify the risk and benefit from the 
tax shields on interest payments. An explanation for the result is that as firms mature and grows 
older in age, they are likely to depend less on debt over time and are considered to be well-
established (Mohamad Ariff et al., 2007) 
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Firm age 
Firm age appears to have a negative relationship and statistically significant at a 0.011 
significance level with firm performance when measured by DR. This result is consistent with 
Pfaffermayr et al. (2013) that firm age has a negative impact on debt ratios which indicate that 
older firms depends less on debt compared to younger firms. Similarly, it is illustrated that a 
firm's debt ratio decreases when they pass their start-up phase period (Berger and Udell, 1998; 
Reid, 2003). Also, the result is consistent with Coad et al. (2013) which stated that ageing firms 
experience lower debt ratios. 
Audit type 
Audit type appears to have a positive relationship and statistically significant at a 0.000 
significance level with firm performance when measured by DR when company hires a Big Four 
to audit its financials. This result is consistent with Beisland et al. (2015) where it is revealed that 
in situations which a significant relationship is present between audit quality and corporate 
governance does exist, the relationship is always positive. 
Also, the result shows that Big Four firm could affect a firm‘s performance positively by leading 
the firm to implement proper routines and information systems. (Porter et al., 2008; Mohamed et 
al., 2013) 
FX 
FX appears to have a positive relationship and statistically significant at a 0.027 significance 
level with firm performance when measured by DR. The result explains as foreign exchange rate 
increases, the debt ratio for a firm increases as well. Bonomo et al. (2003) stated that firms‘ 
financial condition can deteriorate if they are denominated with foreign debt and the real 
exchange rate of the country that the firm is based in depreciates. The excessive debt could lead 
the firm into bankruptcy risk. (Bathala et al., 1994) 
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Revolution 
Revolution appears to have a positive relationship and statistically significant at a 0.042 
significance level with firm performance when measured by DR. This shows that the Arab 
Spring uprisings positively affected firm leverage in terms of the debt ratio measurement. 
5.3 Mann-Whitney Test 
After conducing Mann-Whitney U test, results shows that the variables ROA, ROE, ownership 
concentration, director ownership, institutional ownership,  foreign ownership, firm size, firm 
age, foreign exchange rate, outward foreign direct investment, inward foreign direct investment 
and GDP are all statistically significant with a 0.000 significance level for all variables (except 
for foreign exchange rate which is statistically significant with a 0.023 significance level).  
Moreover, the variables DR, board size, board independence, duality separation, diversity, 
industry type and audit type are statistically insignificant. 
The variables ROA, ROE, foreign exchange rate, outward foreign direct investment and inward 
foreign direct investment were a higher mean rank before the Arab Spring uprising compared to 
during/after the Arab Spring uprising. On the other hand, the variables ownership concentration, 
director ownership, institutional ownership,  foreign ownership, firm size, firm age and GDP 
were a higher mean rank during/after the Arab Spring uprising compared to before the Arab 
Spring uprising. 
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Table (9-1) Mann-Whitney Test Statistics for group variable ‘Rev’ 
 
Mann-Whitney 
U Wilcoxon W Z 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 
ROA 372850.500 778300.500 -4.149- .000 
ROE 365547.000 761152.000 -4.308- .000 
DR 409365.000 845076.000 -1.207- .228 
BrdSize 359725.500 612841.500 -.912- .362 
BrdIndp 358544.500 611660.500 -1.020- .308 
DualSep 362860.500 615976.500 -1.364- .173 
Divers 367991.500 621107.500 -.168- .866 
OwnCon 333844.000 939394.000 -18.895- .000 
DirOwn 493645.500 1099195.500 -11.214- .000 
InstOwn 401980.000 1007530.000 -14.504- .000 
ForgnOwn 572209.000 1177759.000 -3.550- .000 
FrmSize 370160.500 806805.500 -4.684- .000 
FrmAge 513524.500 1081169.500 -5.591- .000 
IndustryType 632812.500 1266187.500 .000 1.000 
AudType 579500.000 1190565.000 -.154- .878 
FX 599161.000 1232536.000 -2.271- .023 
FDIO 160798.000 794173.000 -30.651- .000 
FDII 178852.000 812227.000 -29.478- .000 
GDP 265507.000 684577.000 -16.602- .000 
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6. Summary and Conclusion 
 
The thesis is about the effect of corporate governance on firm performance in Pan Arab 
countries. This paper provides an insight understanding of the corporate governance practices the 
effect of such corporate governance practices on firm performance which is measured using 
ROA, ROE and Debt ratio in 225 firms, excluding financial firms, operating in 11 countries and 
stock markets which are Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates.  
The essence of corporate governance is mainly based on the characteristics of integrity, 
openness, fairness, professionalism and accountability, hence, its implementation is considered 
to be crucial within an institution and essential for management and business dynamics alike. 
The adoption of corporate governance mechanisms ensures to achieve a balance between the 
essential powers of the Board of Directors and their proper accountability, financial stability, 
economic efficiency, sustainable growth and corporate responsibility. 
The paper initially starts with the importance of corporate governance in academic literature and 
on corporations, as well as its significance over the course of history. Different corporate 
governance definitions are then examined by using diverse views from various academic 
literatures and observing governance from different perspectives and point of views for each 
individual or body involved. 
A number of corporate governance theories, their evolution and their implementation into the 
corporate structure of different companies were mentioned to explore views. The fundamental 
corporate governance theories discussed within this study was initiated with the agency theory, 
which later expanded into the stewardship theory and stakeholder theory and later evolved to 
resource dependency theory, in addition to, the shareholder theory. Different corporate 
governance theories and guidelines were previously discussed that addresses the cause and effect 
on different corporate governance variables, and therefore, it is suggested that a combination of 
several theories along with the implementation of a good fit guideline is best to describe an 
effective governance practice rather than hypothesizing corporate governance based on a single 
theory or replicating a guideline that is not best fit for a firm or an industry. 
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Three important and commonly recognized corporate governance codes and guidelines was 
mentioned for the purpose of exploring different governance principles and practices that are 
heavily referenced by institutions and governmental bodies, such as The Cadbury Report (1992) 
developed in the United Kingdom, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) Principles of Corporate Governance (1999 and 2004) which its headquarters is located 
in France, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Law (2002) developed in the United States of America. Later 
on, a brief on corporate governance in the Middle East which is considered to be one of the 
emerging markets in which corporate governance model has been seen as a new thought, and 
despite the constant reforms and demands being made as a result of implementing corporate 
governance practices, challenges has arisen as a result of the Arab Spring aftermath that has 
swept the entire region due to the widespread of corruption and embedded mal-governance. 
Addressing such challenges properly and with appropriate implementation, corporate governance 
should lead to even further reform.  
 Chapter three introduces the development of the seventeen hypotheses supported by different 
literature reviews. Chapter four discusses the research methodology of the study such as 
population and sample selection, data collection, variable measurement and definition and three 
regression models in order to examine the effect of corporate governance on firm performance in 
Pan-Arab countries.  
Chapter five demonstrates the findings and analysis for the following three regression models: 
 Model 1 shows the effect of corporate governance on firm performance measured by 
ROA.  Results show that there is a significant positive relationship with board size, 
institutional ownership, audit type on firm performance measured by ROA, also there a 
significant negative relationship with duality separation, foreign ownership, firm size and 
the revolution variable on firm performance measured by ROA. 
 Model 2 shows the effect of corporate governance on firm performance measured by 
ROE.  Results show that there is a significant positive relationship with board size, 
institutional ownership, audit type on firm performance measured by ROE, also there a 
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significant negative relationship with duality separation, firm size and the revolution 
variable on firm performance measured by ROE. 
 Model 3 shows the effect of corporate governance on firm performance measured by 
Debt Ratio.  Results show that there is a significant positive relationship with director 
ownership, foreign ownership, firm size, foreign exchange rate and the revolution 
variable on firm performance measured by Debt Ratio, also there a significant negative 
relationship with duality separation, institutional ownership and firm age on firm 
performance measured by ROE. 
After conducing Mann-Whitney U test, results shows that the variables ROA, ROE, ownership 
concentration, director ownership, institutional ownership,  foreign ownership, firm size, firm 
age, foreign exchange rate, outward foreign direct investment, inward foreign direct investment 
and GDP are all statistically significant with a 0.000 significance level for all variables (except 
for foreign exchange rate which is statistically significant with a 0.023 significance level).  
The variables ROA, ROE, foreign exchange rate, outward foreign direct investment and inward 
foreign direct investment were a higher mean rank before the Arab Spring uprising compared to 
during/after the Arab Spring uprising. On the other hand, the variables ownership concentration, 
director ownership, institutional ownership,  foreign ownership, firm size, firm age and GDP 
were a higher mean rank during/after the Arab Spring uprising compared to before the Arab 
Spring uprising. 
6.1 Research limitations 
 
The issue of data availability in terms of annual reports for companies in such companies was a 
main issue in order to extract the independent variables board size, board independence, duality 
and diversity. The hardship in extracting annual reports over the time frame this study follows 
was due to the following: 
1- Companies were not required or obligated by the law or the financial regulator of the 
country to publish such reports at that time  
2- Companies were not listed in the stock exchange or did not exist at that time 
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3- Companies did publish annual report, however does not mention the category of directors 
4- Companies no longer publishes previous annual reports considering it out-dated 
5- In some cases, the website for a company does not exist, inactive or is completely out-
dated 
After referencing and researching many papers with similar research, annual reports can still be 
obtained by independent and authorized distributor of information for listed companies in each 
country‘s stock exchange. For example, Egypt for Information Dissemination (egID) is the sole 
aggregator and authorized distributor of the Egyptian stock exchange‘s (EGX) listed companies‘ 
information and could provide financial information, annual reports and other financial reports 
related to companies listed on the EGX stock exchange. However, such services can only be 
obtained in exchange for a certain fees. 
 
Other research limitation faced was limited data availability in terms of the dependent variables 
ROA, ROE and DR while extracting the data from ORBIS for the companies over the years was 
due to the following: 
1-  Financial data for  fiscal year 2015 might not had been available during the date of 
extraction 
2- Financial data was not available for some companies and couldn‘t be obtained by ORBIS 
3- Companies did not exist at that time 
 
It is worth to mention that it is possible to gather some of the missing dependent variables by 
using annual reports and financial statements. However, such method was not used in order to 
unify the collection of data and extracting it from a single source, as well as, time constraints. 
Similarly, research limitation faced was data availability in terms of the economic variables for 
some countries in particular years while extracting from the database Zawya. 
 
6.2 Quality of information 
 
During the extraction of independent variables board size, board independence, duality and 
diversity from annual and board reports, the following was noticed:  
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1- Some board member would resign during the fiscal year and would be replaced with 
another board member. Both board members would be counted as a single board 
member. 
2- Some board member would resign during the fiscal year and would not be replaced. 
Counting the resigned board member within board size will depend on the number board 
meetings took place during the year, if the resigned board member attended more than 
half of the meetings, then the resigned board member will be counted within the board 
size. If board meetings were not mentioned within the annual report, the date of 
resignation will be used as a measurement where the resigned board member is counted 
within board size if resignation date was after September 30
th
. 
3- Annual and board reports for a fiscal year are usually published 1-3 months after the 
fiscal year ends. The possibility of minor changes within the board might occur during 
the mentioned period. Some companies advertise its new board as its final line-up for the 
previous fiscal year which might not capture the precise board size and independence. 
 
6.3 Future Research 
 
The study can be further developed by increasing the sample of companies in each country and 
incorporate and use other controllable variables such as taking in consideration different political 
and cultural factors depending on the country. Furthermore, the ‗DR‘ variable should be included 
as an independent variable within the ‗ROA‘ and ‗ROE‘ models, whereas debt is considered to 
be an important factor in determining debt. Also, the ‗ROA‘ and ‗ROE‘ variables should be 
included as independent variables within the ‗DR‘ model as well. 
Future research should explore the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on a sectorial 
level, also its effects of various degrees of company size (measured in terms of total assets) for 
small, medium and large companies. Also, similar studies such as this can be conducted on 
single countries within the Middle East. 
Even though it has been included with the models, the independent variable ‗FX‘ which 
represents the foreign exchange rate is suggested to be removed within future studies due to most 
Pan Arab countries, especially in the GCC, has a fixed rate currency which is usually controlled 
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by the government if the country. Hence, keeping the independent variable in the model will not 
represent the true relationship on firm performance. 
Rather using dummy variables to categorize a firm‘s industry based on either service or 
manufacturing, it is best to use dummy variables based on sectorial level for the firms, where the 
sector level of a firm is an important factor for profitability. 
In terms of ownership concentration, it is best to consider the biggest three to five shareholders 
rather than considering shareholders with 5% of shares or more. The reason is because there 
might be many shareholders that owns 5% of shares within a company, and hence, doesn‘t 
indicate that there is an ownership concentration. 
Further investigation can be examined regarding the reasons which led to the significance for the 
variables test in the Mann-Whitney Test before and during/after the Arab Spring uprising.  
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Appendix (1) 
 
Table (9-2) Mann-Whitney Test Ranks 
 
Rev N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
ROA .0000 933 967.37 902560.50 
1.0000 900 864.78 778300.50 
Total 1833   
ROE .0000 931 962.36 895958.00 
1.0000 889 856.19 761152.00 
Total 1820   
DR .0000 933 905.76 845076.00 
1.0000 907 935.66 848644.00 
Total 1840   
BrdSize .0000 711 861.94 612841.50 
1.0000 1038 883.94 917533.50 
Total 1749   
BrdIndp .0000 711 860.28 611660.50 
1.0000 1038 885.08 918714.50 
Total 1749   
DualSep .0000 711 866.35 615976.50 
1.0000 1038 880.92 914398.50 
Total 1749   
Divers .0000 711 873.57 621107.50 
1.0000 1038 875.98 909267.50 
Total 1749   
OwnCon .0000 1100 853.99 939394.00 
1.0000 1099 1346.23 1479506.00 
Total 2199   
DirOwn .0000 1100 999.27 1099195.50 
1.0000 1099 1200.82 1319704.50 
Total 2199   
InstOwn .0000 1100 915.94 1007530.00 
1.0000 1099 1284.23 1411370.00 
Total 2199   
ForgnOwn .0000 1100 1070.69 1177759.00 
1.0000 1099 1129.34 1241141.00 
Total 2199   
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FrmSize .0000 934 863.82 806805.50 
1.0000 907 979.88 888755.50 
Total 1841   
FrmAge .0000 1065 1015.18 1081169.50 
1.0000 1119 1166.09 1304850.50 
Total 2184   
IndustryType .0000 1125 1125.50 1266187.50 
1.0000 1125 1125.50 1266187.50 
Total 2250   
AudType .0000 1052 1080.64 1136838.00 
1.0000 1105 1077.43 1190565.00 
Total 2157   
FX .0000 1125 1155.41 1299839.00 
1.0000 1125 1095.59 1232536.00 
Total 2250   
FDIO .0000 1125 1545.07 1738202.00 
1.0000 1125 705.93 794173.00 
Total 2250   
FDII .0000 1125 1529.02 1720148.00 
1.0000 1125 721.98 812227.00 
Total 2250   
GDP .0000 915 748.17 684577.00 
1.0000 1028 1171.22 1204019.00 
Total 1943   
 
 
Table (9-3) Mann-Whitney T-Test Group Statistics 
 
Rev N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
ROA .0000 933 8.474689 8.9505681 .2930284 
1.0000 900 6.998038 9.0312081 .3010403 
ROE .0000 931 14.685404 16.1292923 .5286162 
1.0000 889 11.301397 22.7204779 .7620204 
DR .0000 933 .417275 .2277566 .0074564 
1.0000 907 .431358 .2320194 .0077041 
BrdSize .0000 711 8.34 2.303 .086 
1.0000 1038 8.41 2.153 .067 
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BrdIndp .0000 711 .792600 .2040215 .0076514 
1.0000 1038 .796216 .2124805 .0065951 
DualSep .0000 711 .92 .267 .010 
1.0000 1038 .94 .239 .007 
Divers .0000 711 .21 .659 .025 
1.0000 1038 .19 .607 .019 
OwnCon .0000 1100 19.112391 30.6545079 .9242682 
1.0000 1099 46.104377 36.8464686 1.1114682 
DirOwn .0000 1100 1.816455 7.9955158 .2410739 
1.0000 1099 5.024413 11.2272223 .3386675 
InstOwn .0000 1100 14.766536 26.1111175 .7872798 
1.0000 1099 28.731793 29.1391187 .8789771 
ForgnOwn .0000 1100 3.694127 13.2331244 .3989937 
1.0000 1099 4.406515 13.4048499 .4043553 
FrmSize .0000 934 13.155227 1.5366897 .0502820 
1.0000 907 13.493789 1.6364191 .0543364 
FrmAge .0000 1065 23.453521 19.8167818 .6072371 
1.0000 1119 27.201072 20.1182052 .6014149 
IndustryType .0000 1125 .622222 .4850473 .0144613 
1.0000 1125 .622222 .4850473 .0144613 
AudType .0000 1052 .722433 .4480113 .0138128 
1.0000 1105 .719457 .4494680 .0135213 
FX .0000 1125 .843705 1.1116813 .0331439 
1.0000 1125 .822631 1.1009435 .0328238 
FDIO .0000 1125 5.479556 3.1702113 .0945174 
1.0000 1125 1.704142 1.1027549 .0328778 
FDII .0000 1125 22.557751 13.0888469 .3902340 
1.0000 1125 7.717956 5.1549046 .1536896 
GDP .0000 915 242.173595 193.9898857 6.4131078 
1.0000 1028 447.321025 283.6121234 8.8456191 
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